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BRINGING CLARITY TO TITLE CLEARING

The foreclosure of property tax liens performs an essential economic
function by reconnecting underutilized properties to the real estate
market. To clear title in an efficient and just manner, local
jurisdictions foreclosing on tax liens require clear, balanced
proceduresfor the provision of notice to affected parties. In its 2006
decision in Jones v. Flowers, the U.S. Supreme Courtfound that the
foreclosing jurisdiction's lack of direct follow-up on returned notice
mailings denied the addressee due process because the foreclosing
party did not take steps that would be chosen by "one desirous of
actually informing" the property owner.1 In subjecting to direct
constitutional review the myriad notification decisions a foreclosure
petitioner must make in conducting diligent attempts at notification,
Jones, though rightly decided, threatens the validity of tax foreclosure
proceedings and the titles that result from them in a fundamentally
different way than earlier precedents that made notification more
rigorous without loss of clarity. After demonstrating the Court's
historical use of rules and standards in this area of notice and
opportunity to be heard, this Article will show how the development of
constitutionalsafe harbors can be used to resolve the shortcomings of
the rule-standarddichotomy. Deploying a theoreticalframework for
the judicialfostering offair and efficient constitutionalsafe harbors,
this Article advocates legislative enactment of andjudicialsupportfor
detailed notification protocols tailored to the particular needs and
behaviors of the different types of land interest holders entitled to
foreclosure notice.

In order to provide reliable guidance to foreclosing parties, these
notice procedures should be designed to meet a higher standard
developed in the Court's due processjurisprudence.If a court finds a
set of legislated protocols "reasonably certain to inform" the
interestedpartiesfor whom they were designed, then that court should
judge the constitutionalityof notification choices that come before it
against that certified rule. Such an approach would be preferable to
reviewing those decisions directly using vague, albeit generally less
restrictive, constitutional standards such
as
"reasonably
calculated... to apprise" or "chosen by one desirous of actually
informing." Notification protocols that meet this due process "super
standard" of reasonable certainty can become "safe harbors" for

1. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 238 (2006) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
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those pursuing tax foreclosure remedies while still assuring full
compliance with the guaranteesof notice and opportunity to be heard
embodied in constitutionaljurisprudence.

I. INTRODUCTION

"Water, water everywhere; Nor any drop to drink.",2 Like Coleridge's
thirsty mariner, Baltimore development advocates find themselves adrift
on a sea of vacant properties unable to draw up land suitable for
development. 3 Much of the property is less than one mile away from
Baltimore's downtown Class A office space. These potentially vital
vacant land resources, however, are almost all small row-house lots.
Moreover, each property comes with its own particular set of title
issues.4 Land assembly costs pose a formidable initial barrier to
redevelopment on any significant scale. The process of buying up this
"cheap" land is not particularly cheap. As a result, developers that could
re-use previously urbanized land in older cities instead devour pristine
green space on the metropolitan fringe-aggravating, rather than
alleviating, urban sprawl.
As the owners of vacant lots and abandoned houses are frequently
also delinquent on property taxes and other municipal fees, 5 public sale
and foreclosure of these properties can play a key role in municipal
efforts to make urban communities more viable. 6 Visionary local leaders
2. SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, THE RIME OF THE ANCIENT MARINER, reprinted in THE
OXFORD BOOK OF ENGLISH VERSE, 1250-1918, at 645, 649 (Arthur Quiller-Couch ed., 2d ed. 1961).
3. The older neighborhoods of Baltimore, for instance, are divided into thousands of fifteen-foot
wide row-house lots. Built out to house its 1950 population of a million people, Baltimore's 40% decline
in population has resulted in approximately more than 30,000 vacant lots and houses. John Fritze, City
Gets New Power to Sell its Vacant Property, BALTIMORE SUN, May 14, 2008, at 4B.
4. To paraphrase the opening line of a famous novel: clear titles are all alike; every clouded title
is clouded in its own way. See LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA I (Louise Shanks Maude & Aylmer
Maude trans., Oxford University Press 1998) (1877).
5. As of 2004, of the approximately 14,000 privately-owned buildings in Baltimore cited as
visibly uninhabitable, nearly 8,000 had been put up for tax sale in the previous two years. Baltimore city
data set on file with author. Baltimore has a title clearing remedy aimed at properties that are not tax
delinquent, but are also not in compliance with local building codes. See James J. Kelly, Jr., Refreshing
the Heart of the City: Vacant Building Receivership as a Tool for Neighborhood Revitalization and
Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 210 (2004). Many of
the tax lien foreclosure notification issues discussed in this article also apply to vacant building
receivership sales and eminent domain.
6. Paul C. Brophy & Jennifer S. Vey, Seizing City Assets: Ten Steps to Urban Land Reform,
THE BROOKINGS INST. CEOS FOR CITIES RES. BRIEF 10-12 (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2002, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2002/10metropolitanpolicy-brophy/brophyveyvacan
tsteps.pdf. See also JENNIFER S.VEY, RESTORING PROSPERITY: THE STATE ROLE IN REVITALIZING

AMERICA'S OLDER INDUSTRIAL CITIES 53-55 (2007).
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have initiated vacant land assembly programs, such as Baltimore's
Project 50007 and the Genesee County Land Bank8 in Flint, Michigan;
these acquisition efforts have used tax foreclosure to make properties
available for development without destabilizing the neighborhoods they
seek to revive. 9 By consolidating fractionated titles to scattered parcels
and assembling the properties under the unitary ownership of a land
bank authority,' 0 city governments can reduce critical transaction costs
that inhibit publicly beneficial development.
The viability of tax foreclosure both as a means of collecting property
taxes and as a vehicle for clearing title to abandoned properties depends
on well-designed notice procedures. A community's interest in a
functional land title system requires the use of foreclosure mechanisms
that neither seize properties arbitrarily nor leave them in limbo."1
Homeowners in general need to be assured that, even if their property
taxes go unpaid, they will be still given a meaningful opportunity to save
their homes; they should have confidence that their city or county will
make sure that they receive prior notice of any action to levy on their
homes. Residents who live near a boarded-up, tax delinquent house need

7. See Project 5000, http://www.baltimorehousing.org/index/ps_5000.asp (last visited July 7,
2008). The author served as Legal Consultant for Project 5000 from 2002-2004. In that capacity, the
author designed tax foreclosure notification protocols in consultation with two leading attorneys for
local title underwriters. See infra note 23.
8. See Genesee County Land Bank, Home, http://www.thelandbank.org/ (last visited July 7,
2008).
9. Although eminent domain has been held up as the indispensable redevelopment land
assembly mechanism, tax lien foreclosure allows cities to focus on those properties which have been
truly abandoned by their stakeholders. Condemnations have no mechanism for redemption, tax lien
foreclosure processes allow defaulting owners and lienors to preserve their interests by paying off the
tax debt. Because property tax liens target owners who have failed to meet a basic public obligation,
foreclosure on those liens does not cause the same kind of widespread landowner insecurity that
condemnations do. Most statutory schemes for the collection of unpaid property taxes provide for a
redemption period during which a delinquency can be cured without loss of the property. See discussion
infra Part II.A. Some jurisdictions provide for a redemption period before the property is sold and some
allow redemption after it is sold. Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND.
L.J. 747, 750 (2000). This opportunity to preserve in-kind entitlements, even after a tax delinquency
occurs, allows the foreclosure process to sort out those owners who will continue to invest in their
properties from those who will not.
10. See FRANK S. ALEXANDER, LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., LAND BANK AUTHORITIES:
A GUIDE FOR THE CREATION AND OPERATION OF LOCAL LAND BANKS 2-3 (2005), available at

http://content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/cache/documents/I 112/l11259.pdf. For an examination of the
need for Federal support of local and regional land banking, especially in the wake of the ongoing
mortgage foreclosure crisis, see Frank S. Alexander, Land Banking as Metropolitan Policy, THE
BROOKINGS INST. BLUEPRINT FOR AMERICAN PROSPERITY: UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF A

METROPOLITAN NATION (Washington, D.C.) Oct. 2008, available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media
/Files/rc/papers/2008/1028_mortgage crisis alexander/1028_mortgagecrisisalexander.pdf.
11. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 HOUS. L.
REV. 635 (2000).
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to know that the transfer and rehabilitation of that property will not be
held up by a requirement to track down the owner. An open-ended
search for the noncompliant owner seems particularly unwarranted when
that owner may literally be hiding from
the responsibility of keeping the
12
property up to basic building code.
The U.S. Constitution does not guarantee actual notice to any party
facing foreclosure;1 3 rather, the U.S. Supreme Court has defined
constitutionally adequate notice as "notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
14
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."'
Applying this broad standard in its decision in Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams, 15 the Court concluded that "[n]otice by mail or other
means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional
precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or
property interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in
commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably
ascertainable." 16 Because the Court determined that notice by
publication is not as reliable as notice by mail, 17 legislators are not free
to skip notice by mail altogether even in the special situation of nuisance
properties.
In its 2006 decision in Jones v. Flowers,'8 a divided Supreme Court
ruled that the proper mailing of a tax foreclosure notice did not excuse
the sender's inaction when the notice was known not to have reached its
intended destination. 19 Jones's holding did not explicitly require that a
foreclosure petitioner, when faced with the information of failed
notification, use every feasible means to identify, locate, and personally
serve interested parties. 20 Instead, the Court urged a case-by-case
balancing approach to determine whether a foreclosing party's follow-up
decisions were those of one "desirous of actually informing the
absentee.",2 1 Local jurisdictions collecting delinquent tax revenue and

12. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
13. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 227-29 (2006); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161
(2002); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See infra note 51 and
accompanying text.
14. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
15. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
16. Id. at 800 (emphasis in original). See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
17. See Mennonite Bd.of Missions, 462 U.S. at 799-800 ; Schroeder v. City of New York, 371
U.S. 208, 211-12 (1962); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315-16.
18. 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 229 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
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clearing title to vacant properties, however, will be just as lost in
applying a vague, subjective standard as they would be in following a
strict mandate to try everything practicable before resorting to
publication notice.
In striking a careful balance between the rigor of standards for
diligent notification and ease of completion, policymakers must fashion
guidelines for adequate notice that are clear and stable. By clearly
defining the process for identifying and notifying persons facing
liquidation of real property interests in the tax sale and foreclosure
processes, courts and legislatures would not only promote effective
notice to respondents, but would also establish standards by which the
validity of tax titles could be evaluated.22 Detailed procedures for
naming, finding, and notifying those in title on a tax delinquent property
then become checklists for those carrying out the foreclosure and for the
settlement agents that would determine whether the resulting titles were
insurable and therefore potentially financeable for redevelopment.2 3
However, vague or obsolete notification requirements could cause
abandoned properties to remain in limbo just as indefinitely as
unattainable notice standards would. Attorneys clearing title cannot
bring tax delinquent, vacant properties out of limbo if they themselves
are forced into a netherworld of ad hoc procedural standards for
notifying property owners and other affected parties. Foreclosure is all
about appropriate finality. 24 Unsurprisingly, title clearing needs clarity.
Just at the time when Jones is prodding foreclosing petitioners to use
ill-defined cost-benefit analyses to make everyday decisions on pursuing
notification by mail, the Internet is rapidly expanding the feasibility of
obtaining corrected information as to the identities and locations of
parties affected by foreclosure. 2 5 Courts following the Jones approach

22. Failure to give legally required notice renders transfer of title a nullity. ALEXANDER, supra
note 10, at 782, 798-800; cf 2 RUFFORD G. PATTON & CARROLL G. PATTON, PATTON ON LAND TITLES
§§ 468, 490 (2d ed. 1957) (discussing that whether failure to give required notice voids a title transfer
varies by jurisdiction and discussing that methods of notification in tax foreclosures vary by
jurisdiction).
23. In his work as a legal consultant for Baltimore's Project 5000, the author created the

protocols for tax foreclosure notification in consultation with regional counsel for two title insurance
underwriters. The primary goal of Project 5000 is to create unified insurable title in the City of

Baltimore

to

make

these

properties

http://www.baltimorehousing.org/index/ps

available
5000

for

productive

use.

See

Project

5000,

.asp (last visited July 7, 2008). For a discussion of how

the fractionation phenomenon known as "anticommons" frustrates market allocation indefinitely, see
infra note 198 and accompanying text.

24. For a brief examination of the historical development of foreclosure, see Carol M. Rose,
Crystals andMudin PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 583-85 (1988).
25. See infra note 131 and accompanying text; cf Stewart E. Sterk, Tax Sale Foreclosures: What
Notice is Due?, 17 No. 6 N.Y. REAL EST. L. REP. 1 (2007) (noting that "as computers and the Internet
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will continue to second-guess the diligence of foreclosing jurisdictions
that have complied with statutory requirements without achieving actual
notice. By subjecting specific "follow-up" decisions to a vague
constitutional balancing of the interests, courts eliminate predictability
and stability from the tax foreclosure system. 26 An insistent and
unmediated use of standards to answer questions about acceptable
follow-up measures to failed mailings will move the jurisprudence of
notice and the opportunity to be heard toward the same kind of
incoherence plaguing the regulatory takings doctrine. 27 To achieve the
appropriate "meta-balance" 28 between the use of rules and the use of
standards, courts should develop an alternative set of standards by which
safe harbor rules can be judged. In the context of tax foreclosure,
tailored and detailed notification protocols that are found to be
"reasonably certain to inform" 29 targeted foreclosure respondents would
be the sole referents for the constitutional adequacy of notice to
interested parties. If a legislature failed to offer a valid systematic
approach to follow-up decisions, foreclosing jurisdictions would still be
able to show adequate notice in any particular case by demonstrating
diligence under the more general constitutional standards.
Without returning to the formalism of the pre-Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 30 era, legislators and court administrators
should systematize these evolving "practicalities and peculiarities '31 of
tax foreclosure raised by the many follow-up questions occasioned by
mail notice. The courts, in their adjudicative capacity, should support
and encourage these efforts, even as they strictly limit the extent to
which these rules diverge from the standards they seek to replace. 32
Even though all stakeholders in a property are entitled to an attempted

make it increasingly feasible to locate a property owner with a few clicks of a mouse, notice 'reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances' may require more than just a mailing to the address found in the
public records .... ).
26. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992)
(discussing the differences between standards and rules); cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court,
1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984) (arguing that
judges should analyze rules using an ex ante viewpoint instead of an ex post viewpoint).
27. Procedural due process in the context of follow-up measures is developing its own
conceptual severance problem. See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
28. Alexander Aleinikoff used this term to describe how courts interpreting constitutional
provisions moderate their use of standards, which foster case-by-case balancing. T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE L.J. 943, 979 (1987). For a discussion
of the comparative advantages of rules and standards, see infra Part III.E.2.
29. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
30. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
31. Id. at 314.
32. See infra notes 171-85 and accompanying text.

2008]

BRINGING CLARITY TO TITLE CLEARING

71

mailing, the guidelines for follow-up measures in carrying out notice by
mail should reflect the different ways by which each class of
stakeholders relates to their property interests. 33 Rules tailored to the
needs and actions of different types of stakeholders can provide not only
appropriate levels of notification certainty, but also use methods
particularly well-suited to each class of interested parties.
Additionally, rule-makers that can, with confidence of judicial
support and appropriate deference, invest the time in crafting tax
foreclosure procedures will provide for a stable and efficient process
even as communication technology continues to advance. For instance,
mortgagees that trade their interests on the Internet like corporate stocks
may benefit from a completely different approach to notification-one
that looks to the Internet not only as a complex and evolving source of
postal address information, but also as a principal vehicle for efficient
exchange of foreclosure information. Just as the postal service displaced
newspaper publication as the legitimate means of foreclosure notice, so
too is the Internet reshaping our understanding of how information about
events affecting land titles, including tax sales and foreclosures, should
be disseminated. Electronic recordation of title documents not only
reduces the transaction costs of real estate transfers, but also creates an
entirely new information space where parties in title-especially
sophisticated, commercial ones-can cheaply maintain virtual contact
with the status of their real estate interests.
The next Part of the Article begins by setting out the historical
development and analytic framework of the law of adequate notice in
the current tax foreclosure notification system. It then analyzes Jones's
problematic application of the "desirous of actually informing" standard
to tax foreclosure responses to known failure to achieve direct notice of
affected parties. Part II ends by arguing for the deployment of the
"reasonably certain to inform" standard to evaluate the validity of
comprehensive tax foreclosure notification protocols as extrajudicially
generated constitutional safe harbors. Part III of the Article sets out an
array of approaches to notification follow-up differentiated by property
interest type. It then shows how the judicial deference required by the
proposed system of constitutional safe harbors will not only clarify and
stabilize notice by mail but may also lay the groundwork for "e-

33. For instance, since owner-occupants stand to lose a great deal in foreclosure and can be
expected to receive notice, it would make sense to require foreclosing entities to make, and possibly
confirm delivery of, notice to the subject property address. For the absentee owner of a vacant building
known to be in violation of local building code, however, the rules for notice by mail should sharply
limit the prospect of a wild goose chase for an owner who has most likely abandoned his property. See
infra III.B.
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notification" as a radically different but constitutionally acceptable form
of tax foreclosure notification.
II. TAX

FORECLOSURE NOTIFICATION BEFORE AND AFTER MULLANE

A. The Foreclosureof Property Tax Liens
Every state provides some statutory scheme for collecting unpaid
property taxes by levying on the property itself.34 Nearly all of these can
be characterized as a type of tax foreclosure. Only those few states that
auction off co-ownership interests in the delinquent property can be said
to avoid the need to foreclose completely the debtor-owner's equity of
redemption.35 The rest divest the owner of all interests in the property.36
The vast majority of jurisdictions rely on a combined sale and
foreclosure process to make sure both that the taxes due are paid in full
and that any surplus value in the property is made available to the
stakeholders whose interests have been liquidated.37 These collection
processes generally provide a set period of time for redemption either
34. Judicial: ALA. CODE § 40-10-12 (2008); ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.370 (2008); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 42-18201 (2008);_CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-157 (West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9,
§ 8742 (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.502 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-1003 (2008); 35 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/21-75 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-4.7 (West 2008); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 79-2801 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.420 (West 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5031
(2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 552 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-834 (West 2008);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 60, § 65 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 279.01 (West 2008); Miss.

CODE ANN. § 27-41-11 (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 140.190 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1516-403 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1902 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 361.5648 (2007); N.J.

STAT. ANN. § 54:5-6 (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-48 (West 2008); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 1123 (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-355 (West 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5702-40 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5721.10 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 312.010 (West
2007); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5860.301 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-9-25 (2007); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-51-40 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-22-21 (2008); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.91
(Vernon 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 5191 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3340 (West 2007); WASH
REV. CODE § 84.56.020 (2007). Nonjudicial: ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-101 (West 2008); CAL. REV. &
TAX. CODE § 3691 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-11-101 (West 2008); GA. CODE ANN.

§ 48-3-3 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 246-56 (2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 446.15 (West 2008); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.60 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80:59 (2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 68, § 3105 (West 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-2003 (West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-21303 (West 2008); W. VA. CODE § 11 A-2-1 (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 75.12 (West 2008); WYO. STAT.

ANN. § 39-13-108 (2007).
35. Iowa, for example, allows bidders willing to pay the full amount of taxes due on a property to
acquire undivided ownership interests in the property. IOWA CODE ANN. § 446.15 (West 2008).
36. Foreclosure results unless, of course, there is a redemption of the property or the successfil
assertion of a defense such as the invalidation of the underlying debt.
37. Michigan provides for a public sale but applies the age old remedy of strict foreclosure.
Thus, failure to redeem the property by payment of the taxes due results in a total forfeiture of the
property with any surplus going to the governmental creditor. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.60(4)
(2008).
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before the sale, before final, indefeasible title has passed to the new
owners, or before both.
Some states grant longer or shorter periods of redemption for different
types of property interests. For instance, Kansas provides for a two-year
post-sale redemption period during which counties must postpone
foreclosure to allow owners to save their property interests by paying off
any delinquencies. 38 For homestead properties, however, owners have
three years to redeem. 39 Owners of vacant buildings, on the other hand,
receive only one year after the sale to prevent foreclosure. 40 While
Kansas recognizes the importance of the equity of redemption for all
owners, it has made the decision that homestead owners should have
enhanced stability of tenure. At the same time, the community as
represented by the local taxing authority should not have to be as patient
with unoccupied properties where "there has been a failure to perform
reasonable maintenance.'
The super-priority nature of the property tax lien allows tax
foreclosure to clear out not only the ownership interests, but also any
existing private lien interests in the subject property.42 Unlike a
judgment lien for a private debt, a property tax lien allows its holder to
foreclose on interests that were created and recorded prior to any
delinquency by the property owner. For this reason, tax foreclosure can
be an extremely powerful tool for restoring unity to a title that has
become broken up by multiple mortgages and various judgment liens;
the lack of investment that makes the property a nuisance becomes the
very means of freeing it for future use.
Because claims for unpaid property taxes take priority over preexisting private liens, all parties with substantial interests in the property
are entitled to notice of their opportunity to redeem.43 A mortgagee
pursuant to a properly recorded deed of trust or other mortgage interest
cannot be deprived of its security interest in the property unless and until
38. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2401a(a)(l) (2007).
39. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2401a(b)(l) (2007).
40. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2401a(a)(2) (2007). Maryland provides two types of accelerated postsale foreclosure processes. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-833 (West 2008). Persons that purchase
properties as part of a special tax sale of abandoned properties may commence foreclosure proceedings
the day after the sale. § 14-833(0. Even a property sold at a conventional sale can be foreclosed upon six
months after the sale, half the normal time period, if a building on the property has been certified as
needing substantial repair. § 14-833(e).
41. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2401a(a)(2) (2007).
42. ALEXANDER, supra note 10, at 760.
43. Because mortgagees and judgment creditors have no actual ownership rights, their right to
redeem allows them to preserve their remedies for collecting money owed to them by the property
owners. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 558, 689-94 (4th ed.
2001).
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it has been afforded adequate notice of the need to prevent foreclosure."
The Supreme Court has also extended the right of meaningful notice and
opportunity to be heard to those claiming a lien on a property pursuant
to a money judgment against its owner.4 5
In designing notification protocols, legislatures balance the
community's need for title clearing and the stakeholders' need for
stability of ownership, just as they do in establishing foreclosure
timetables. Legislatures approach the establishment of redemption
periods and the design of notice procedures differently, however,
because of the procedural due process requirements imposed on the
latter by the Constitution. Failure to give constitutionally adequate
notice to a stakeholder leaves that stakeholder's interest in the subject
property unaffected by the tax foreclosure proceeding.4 6 Constructive
notice, such as publication of an advertisement in a newspaper of
general circulation, can constitute constitutionally adequate notice, but
only after diligent attempts at direct notification have been made.47
Direct notice consists of three stages: identifying the interest holder
affected by the foreclosure, locating the interest holder, and delivering
notice for the interest holder to the foreclosure location. If either the
interest itself or the party holding it is undiscoverable, then constructive
notice will suffice to clear out that interest. Likewise, if a named
stakeholder cannot be located, then no mailing is necessary for the title
to be valid.4 8 Failure in the delivery phase, on the other hand, frequently
reveals some problem in the information obtained in either of the first
two steps. If a party cannot receive mail at an address attributed to him
because he or she no longer lives there, or is no
or her, it is probably
49
longer living.
Foreclosing parties that realize they have not achieved actual
notification constantly face the same question as to when further efforts
at identification, location, or delivery are no longer warranted. Both the
effectiveness of notice to property stakeholders and the stability of tax
titles hinge on the soundness of this answer. An examination of the
progression of constitutional jurisprudence on notice and opportunity to

44. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983).
45. Tulsa Prof Collection Services v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988).

46. PATTON & PATON, supra note 22, §§ 468, 490. For a discussion of the variety of
consequences of invalid tax foreclosure proceedings, see ALEXANDER, supra note 10, at 798-800.
47. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams., 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983).

48. Id.
49. Returned mail can indicate the need to re-send the notice to the same address, but it can also
reveal that the property interest holder has not yet been properly located or even properly identified. See
discussion infra Part III.C.1 and text accompanying notes 125-28.
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be heard provides the resources needed to generate a clear, stable
approach to appropriate follow-up measures in tax foreclosure
notification.
B. The CaretakerPrincipleand Pennoyer's Bright-Line Rule
Courts have consistently held that the legitimacy of all judgments in
civil litigation depends on the ability of parties affected by them to
participate in the processes that produce them. 50 Nevertheless, the
jurisprudence of notice and opportunity to be heard includes no general
constitutional entitlement to actual notice. Rather, due process requires
adequate notice only. 51 The balance fashioned by this doctrine
necessarily leaves a would-be respondent's ability to participate in
proceedings against him somewhat to chance. As courts have
acknowledged, "[d]ue process 'does not require with regard to notice
that the state ...erect an ideal system for the administration of justice
which is impervious to malfunctions.' 52 The jurisprudence of adequate
notice, however, also reflects the judiciary's lack of comfort with the
role that happenstance has to play in this foundational aspect of
procedural justice. Courts continuously reappraise the balance between
diligence and practicability looking for opportunities to secure more
substantial guarantees of actual notice for named respondents. 53 As
communication and information technologies make strides, yesterday's
acceptable means of notification must yield to the more effective notice
methods of today.
In the early nineteenth century, the need for effective adjudication of
land titles was strong, but the ability to track down and directly notify
nonlocal litigants was weak. Nineteenth century landowners, whether or
not they continuously occupied their properties, were expected to make
sure that they received notice of legal actions affecting their title by
maintaining contact, directly or indirectly, with their land. As Chief

50. "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). See also Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449 (1982); Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Lawrence Solum has identified this
participation principle as the first principle of procedural justice. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 273-74 (2004) ("Procedures that purport to bind without affording
meaningful rights of participation are fundamentally illegitimate.").
51.

Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 227-29 (2006); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161

(2002); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
52. Griffin v. Bierman, 941 A.2d 475, 482 (Md. 2008) (quoting Carroll v. D.C. Dep't of
Employment Serv., 487 A.2d 622, 623 (D.C. 1985)).
53. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 227-29 (2006).
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54
Justice Marshall stated in The Mary:

[I]t is a principle of natural justice, of universal obligation, that before the
rights of an individual be bound by a judicial sentence, he shall have
notice, either actual or implied, of the proceedings against him. Where
these proceedings are against the person, notice is served personally, or
by publication; where they are in rem, notice is served upon the thing
itself. This is necessarily notice to all those who have any interest in the
thing, and is reasonable because it is necessary, and because it is the part
of common prudence for all those who have any interest5 5 in it, to guard
that interest by persons who are in a situation to protect it.
The Mary was a ship, the seizure of which might have been more
noticeable to its owners than that of land, which is clearly much less
portable. Nevertheless, courts used this caretaker principle to facilitate
the foreclosure of land owned by nonresidents. 56 Posting of the property
was offered as the analogue to seizure of a chattel.5 7 Publication of a
legal notice in a local newspaper supplemented these efforts to notify the
owner of the land or its caretaker.5 8
Sixty years later, Pennoyer v. Neff 9 defended constructive notice as
crucial to the functioning of a territorial jurisdictional system. 60 While
state courts at that time could assert personal jurisdiction on anyone
physically present within their territorial boundaries, their inability to
determine the rights and liabilities of persons not present in the state was
just as clear. The need for state courts to resolve disputes over the
ownership of land within their borders even if non-residents were among
the claimants required an alternative theory of jurisdiction. The majority
opinion in Pennoyer cited the tradition that seizure of a person's
property located within a state gives a court jurisdiction to determine the
disposition of that property. 61 Believing that seizure itself was the
primary form of notification, the Court presented notice by publication
as a sufficient supplemental means of notice. 62 Pennoyer's formalistic
approach set down the caretaker principle as full justification for
reliance on published notice and identified valid constructive notice
directly with the in rem action.

54. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126 (1815).
55. Id. at 144.
56. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
57. Id. at 316.
58. Id. at 315-16.
59. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 727-28.
62. Id. at 727.
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The caretaker principle was indispensable to an effective system of
adjudication based on territorial jurisdiction. Not only was the prospect
of out-of state notification by mail much less certain in the nineteenth
century than in the twentieth, but prevailing understandings of comity
among state courts also precluded the sending of process generated by
one state court into the territory of another state. 63 At the turn of the
century, the U.S. Supreme Court, on four occasions, affirmed notice by
publication by governmental entities to prosecute tax foreclosure
actions. 64 Confident in the basis for notification by publication, state
legislatures began to enact statutes that allowed for foreclosure of tax
delinquent properties through notice by publication. 65 Even as they did
so, however, the legitimizing foundations for constructive notice in tax
foreclosure and other in rem proceedings were eroding.
As state courts became increasingly involved in interstate litigation,
territoriality as a basis for jurisdiction over the rights and obligations of
parties revealed its flaws. Forum shopping plaintiffs brought actions
against nonresident defendants solely because they were served within a
state's territorial borders.66 Others initiated quasi in rem actions by
attaching property located within a state to hale in nonresident
defendants on tort or contract matters that had little to do with any
activity in the state or even with the property seized.67 In International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,68 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Pennoyer's
territorial understanding of jurisdiction over parties in favor of a
"minimum contacts" standard. 69 The collapse of territorial formalism in
the constitutional foundations for personal jurisdiction presaged a
parallel rejection of the formal divisions between in rem and in
personam matters with regard to notice and opportunity to be heard.
With the availability of direct notice by mail, plaintiffs seeking in rem
relief could no longer justify a categorical entitlement to proceeding on
constructive notice by publication.
63. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1977).
64. See Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414, 418 (1908); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 261-62
(1907); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 93 (1904); Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S.
526, 537-38 (1895), cf Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559, 562-64 (1889)
(holding that notice by publication of the proposed taking of land for a railroad is sufficient due
process).
65. ALEXANDER, supra note 10, at 764-66.

66. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
67. Id. at 316-18.
68. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
69. Id. at 316. This case-by-case fair play approach was not imposed on tax foreclosure and other
quasi in rem cases in which land located within the jurisdiction was the subject of the proceedings.
Shaffer v. Heitner. 433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977). States must be able to settle their own property
disputes even if some claimants have no other connection to the forum. Id.
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The steady expansion of U.S. mail service in the decades that
followed the Civil War led to free delivery service for nearly a quarter of
the nation's population in 1890.70 Nearly all of these mail recipients
were city dwellers; the introduction of the Rural Free Delivery and
Village Delivery systems during the next twenty years put America on a
rapid path to universal, written communication by mail. 71 By the middle
of the twentieth century, newspapers crowded with legal notices could
not hope to compete as a means of notification with the simplicity and
directness of mailing a letter. Pennoyer's formalistic divide had to give
way; courts could no longer require that meaningful notice be given to
defendants for in personam matters and simultaneously provide for only
the illusion of such notice for the holders of property interests affected
by proceedings in rem.
C. Mullane's Standard(s)for Adequate Notice
Five years after Pennoyer's territorial formalism as the basis for
evaluating the constitutionality of long-arm personal jurisdiction was
rebuffed in InternationalShoe,72 the Supreme Court rendered a parallel
rejection of it in the area of notice and opportunity to be heard.7 3
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust involved publication notice
by a major financial institution as part of a proceeding to merge and
settle claims regarding certain trusts. 74 The bank used the statutorily
prescribed method of notice by advertisement against parties for whom
it was a fiduciary and with whom it was in regular mail
communication.75 As Justice Jackson's opinion suggested, the bank need
not have even made a separate mailing to notify the affected
beneficiaries but could have merely included a conspicuous notice in the
remittances it was already sending out periodically. 6 The Court did not
bother to determine whether or not the matter could be classified as
some form of in rem proceeding; 77 instead, it offered an alternative
inquiry for determining the adequacy of notice that could be applied to
all cases. According to Mullane, all determinations as to the adequacy of
notice and opportunity to be heard must be evaluated by a single

70. CARL H. SCHEELE, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MAIL SERVICE (1970).
71. Id.
72. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
73. See Mullane v. Central Hannover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
74. Id. at 307-10.
75. Id. at 310.
76. Id. at 318-19.
77. Id. at 312-13.
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79

standard: "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency 78
of the action and afford them
objections.,
their
present
to
an opportunity
Mullane did not reject the caretaker principle, only its formalistic
application to all in rem proceedings. The Court approvingly cited
79
Justice Marshall's explanation of the caretaker principle in The Mary.
In his account of the vigilance to be expected of normally prudent
property owners, Justice Jackson saw a similar weighing of costs and
benefits as that which informs the "reasonably calculated" standard.80
The Court refused, however, to encase the balancing of the parties'
interests in a rule that identified constructive notice with in rem
proceedings simply because the caretaker principle applied to those
cases generally. An owner's actual or expected interaction with his
property was just one of many factors to consider in calculating
the
81
effectiveness.
method's
notification
particular
a
of
likelihood
In reasserting the importance of meaningful notice in matters in rem
as well as in personam, the Court stated: "[W]hen notice is a person's
due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." 82 The word
"desirous" as used here implicitly suggests a balancing of the interests of
petitioner and respondent by having the former internalize, if only
through imagination, the benefits of providing actual notice as well as
the costs. Substantively, the computation of cost and benefit is the same
as the "reasonably calculated" formula. 83 This construction of the
notifying party as a fiduciary for the notice recipient, however, allows
for a departure from the system design approach. Now, the party
carrying out notice is not only expected to follow reasonably designed
rules but may be called upon to apply them in a way that takes into
account the interests of those being notified as well.84 Subsequent
78. Id. at 314.
79. Id. at 316 (noting that "'[i]t is the part of common prudence for all those who have any
interest in (a thing), to guard that interest by persons who are in a situation to protect it."' (quoting The
Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126 (1815))).
80. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-316. Even as the Court in Mullane found notice by publication
fundamentally ineffective as a means of notice, it invoked the caretaker principle to allow for the
possibility that it may be justified in certain cases where an owner "has left tangible property in the
state ...." Id. at 316. The other justification stemmed from the owner's abandonment of the property, in
which case lack of effective notice would "deprive him of nothing ...."Id.
81.

Id. at313-17.

82. Id. at 315.
83. See id.

84. See id. Conflict of interest, especially for private purchasers of tax lien certificates interested
in taking title to the property, has suffused judicial analysis of notification choices with suspicion of the

80
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Supreme Court decisions interpreting Mullane have uniformly
proclaimed their commitment to evaluating efforts to give notice from
an ex ante perspective. 85 An analysis, however, of the move from
formalistic rules, to general standards applied to system choices, and
then to subjective standards used for case-by-case balancing shows that
doctrine of notice 86and opportunity to be heard is rapidly becoming ex
ante in name only.
D. Mennonite: Mail as a "Notice [System] Reasonably Calculatedto
Apprise"
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,87 the Court explicitly
rejected the argument that a stakeholder's actual or constructive
knowledge of tax delinquency absolved the foreclosing state actor of its
duties to provide notice as prescribed by Mullane.88 Moreover, it
extended the right of direct notification of the tax sale to any party with
a legally protected interest in the subject property. 89 The majority
opinion also established mail as the minimum constitutional standard for
effective notification systems. 90 While the Court did not specifically
require states to prescribe the use of the U.S. Postal Service to notify
stakeholders, any alternative system would have to be "as certain to
ensure actual notice ...[to] any party, whether unlettered or well versed
in commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably
ascertainable." 9' Therefore, after Mennonite, aside from personal service
itself, mail stood alone as the only adequate primary method of
92
notification.

petitioner's motives whenever actual notice is not achieved; cf Slattery v. Friedman, 636 A.2d 1, 6-7
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (requiring holders of certificates of sale to have the "objective" of finding the

owners of the property because holders have "little incentive" to search extensively because holders
"will often benefit if the owners are not located"); ALEXANDER, supra note 10, at 794 (recognizing that
imposing a broader duty on certificate holders to locate and notify property owners is justified by the
conflict of interest between owners and holders).
85. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 231 (2006); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S.
161, 167-68 (2002).
86. See infra Part IE. Judge Easterbrook has argued that balancing for substantive fairness on a

case-by-case basis is inevitably an ex post exercise that corrodes the predictability of an ex ante rulebased approach. Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 1I.
87. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
88. Id. at 799-800.
89. Id. at 800.
90. Id.
91. Id. (emphasis in original).
92. See id. The Court eliminated notice by posting on the subject premises as an equivalent to
mail service in Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
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Although Mullane and other cases striking down notice by
publication for real estate takings 93 encouraged many states to reform
their tax foreclosure procedures, the Mennonite decision invalidated tax
foreclosure procedures in the majority of states.94 Over the next few
decades, state legislatures instituted new procedures for identifying and
95
locating stakeholders to be notified by mail as well as by other means.
These procedures guided tax foreclosing plaintiffs through identification
and notification steps likely to give the proper parties actual notice and
96
to result in valid titles should the proceeding end in a final foreclosure.
Courts interpreting Mennonite generally supported the efforts of
legislatures to reasonably define the public records to be searched in
identifying and locating stakeholders with legally protected property
interests. 97 With the parameters of the title search established, the
notification itself consisted of sending out the prescribed notice by the
particular form or forms of mail provided for by statute, court rule, or
both. Once these systems were established and sustained after
constitutional challenge, title insurance carriers had the means to judge
valid tax titles. Although individual mailings made for a more complex
notification method than a single publication, Mennonite's clear,
delineated endorsement of mail as a reasonable system offered
unambiguous guidance to legislatures as to the Court's expectations.
Balancing competing interests does not always cause instability.
When standards have been used to evaluate the basic choice of a direct
notification system and the initial procedures for implementing any
notification system emulating personal delivery, the results have been
positive. At this level of generality, the broad reasonableness standard
has produced uniform rules that apply to all tax foreclosures. Mennonite
requires jurisdictions foreclosing on tax liens to notify all holders of
substantial property interests by mail or some other equally effective
system. 98 The real test, however, for any rule-based approach to
fundamental rights presents itself when a court's strict application of the
particular rule conflicts with a principle of fundamental fairness. Mailed
notice as a minimum requirement cannot conflict with the demands of
due process, but a rule that declares mailed notice to be an inherently
adequate means of notification may, in certain cases, deprive would-be

93. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (holding that notice by publication
and notice by posting on the premises do not satisfy due process where no letter is mailed).
94. ALEXANDER, supranote 10, at 767-69.
95. Id. at 789-92.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983).
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respondents of their right to participate in legal proceedings. Even
properly addressed and stamped mailings sometimes fail to reach their
intended recipients. Postal procedures for certified mail make this mode
particularly vulnerable to returns marked "unclaimed." 99 These
circumstances, if relevant to the question of notice adequacy, require
courts to move from the basic approach to notification to more
particularized implementation issues.
More than a decade prior to its decision in Mennonite, the Supreme
Court confronted the issue of a failed notice by mail in Robinson v.
10 0 In that case, the Court held, per curiam, that notice mailed
Hanrahan.
to the defendant's home address in a forfeiture proceeding was
inadequate because the State knew that the defendant was in jail.' 1
Because the defendant's incarceration was known at the time of the
mailing, the notification sent to the defendant's former home was not
"reasonably calculated" to provide actual notice.102 More recently, the
Court upheld the adequacy of a forfeiture notice that failed to reach a
prisoner because the sender lacked actual knowledge that the prison
authorities had failed to give it to the inmate addressee.
In Dusenbery v. United States,10 3 the Court resisted the prisoner's
attempts to have the government's actions subjected to the procedural
balancing test put forward in Mathews v. Eldridge.10 4 Instead, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, insisted that Mullane,
governed the case, not Mathews.10 5 The Court reasoned that the costeffective improvements prison officials subsequently made to their
procedures for handling certified mail addressed to prisoners did not
invalidate the overall system of using certified mail to notify prisoners
of civil forfeiture proceedings.' 0 6 The ex ante perspective of Mullane's
reasonably calculated requirement allowed the Court to concentrate its
analysis on the rationality of the system, rather than on the
reasonableness of the government's actions in that particular Situation.107

99. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
100. 409 U.S. 38 (1972) (per curiam).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 40.
103. 534 U.S. 161 (2002).
104. Id. at 167-68; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
105. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 167-68.
106. Id. at 171-72.
107. See id. Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, did not employ Mathews' balancing factors
either. Instead, citing Mullane, she argued that the system for handling mail at the prison was itself
inadequate because a feasible alternative existed that was "substantially more likely to bring home
notice." Id. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339

U.S. 306, 315 (1950)).
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Does a foreclosing jurisdiction that has designed a system of
notification by mail "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances,"' 0 8 to achieve actual notice have any further obligation
when it learns the system has failed to actually notify a holder of a
substantial property interest to be liquidated in foreclosure? While courts
around the country had confronted this question in each of the three
stages of notice by mail, 10 9 neither Robinson nor Dusenbery presented
facts that required the Supreme Court to do so. The Court, however,
could not avoid the issue indefinitely.
In 2006, the Court addressed this
"new wrinkle" in Jones v. Flowers.110
E. "What Would Jones Do? ": The Problem with Follow-Up Decisions
as Made by "One Desirous... of Actually Informing"
1. Jones v. Flowers
Jones v. Flowers involved a tax foreclosure brought against an
Arkansas property owner, Gary Jones, who no longer lived at the subject
property."' Jones had not provided the Commissioner of State Lands
with his new address despite a statutory obligation to do so. 112 While
Jones had a mortgage on the property, his taxes were escrowed as part of
his monthly payments. 13 After he paid off the mortgage, however, the
taxes became delinquent and the local taxing authority commenced
proceedings. 114 A state statute required that notice be given twice by
certified mail to the address of record-in this case that of the subject
property. 115 The certified mailings were both returned marked
"unclaimed."''16

108. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
109. See Plemons v. Gale, 396 F.3d 569, 576 (4th Cir. 2005); Hamilton v. Renewed Hope, Inc.,
589 S.E.2d 81, 85 (Ga. 2003); Dahn v. Trownsell, 576 N.W.2d 535, 541-42 (S.D. 1998), abrogatedby
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2005); Malone v. Robinson, 614 A.2d 33, 38 (D.C. 1992); Elizondo v.
Read, 588 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ind. 1992), abrogatedby Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2005); St. George
Antiochian Orthodox Christian Church v. Aggarwal, 603 A.2d 484, 490 (Md. 1992); Wells Fargo Credit
Corp. v. Ziegler, 780 P.2d 703, 705 (Okla. 1989); Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P.2d 778, 780-83 (Alaska
1986); Giacobbi v. Hall, 707 P.2d 404, 408 (Idaho 1985); Tracy v. County of Chester, Tax Claim
Bureau, 489 A.2d 1334, 1338-39 (Pa. 1985); City of Atlantic City v. Block C-I l, Lot 11, 376 A.2d 926,
928 (N.J. 1977), abrogatedby Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2005).
110. 547 U.S. 220, 227 (2006).
111. Id. at 223-24.
112. Id. at 231.
113. Id. at 223.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 223-24.
116. Id.
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The Court found that the Commissioner had complied with the letter
of the notice requirements, standards that were not invalid on their face.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Commissioner knew that his attempts at
notification had failed gave rise to a duty to make some other reasonable
effort at notification.1 17 In the absence of further guidance from the
statute, the Commissioner had an affirmative constitutional duty to
improvise. 118
Mennonite extended Mullane's direct notice protection to mortgagees
faced with possible loss due to the tax sale of their collateral.1 19 While
this application of Mullane's circumstances test greatly increased the
scope of the notice-by-mail system, it did not make tax foreclosure
notification any less systematic. Jones, on the other hand, used
Mullane's construction of the party giving notice as "one desirous of
actually informing the absentee"' 120 to require repeated and varied
attempts at direct notification in the face of information that prior efforts
had failed. 12 1 When notice was first sent out to Jones by certified mail,
requirements that it be reasonably calculated to
such notification met the
22
provide actual notice.'
In his dissent in Jones, Justice Thomas insisted that the Court should
fix its ex ante perspective at the time of the sending of the notice and
sustain not only the system but also the Commissioner's adherence to
123
Writing for the Court, however, Chief Justice Roberts drew upon
it.
Mullane's construction of the notice provider as a fiduciary for the
notice recipient to emphasize the need for the fiduciary to be proactive
in its protection of the would be notice recipient's interests. 124 By
forcing foreclosing parties into a case-by-case evaluation of the
117. Id. at 225.
118. Id. Under Jones, foreclosing entities that actually did follow up appropriately, even though
the statute did not explicitly require such additional action, would nevertheless have achieved adequate
service. Thus, they would not encounter the jurisdictional problem the Court found in Wuchter v.
Pizzutti. 276 U.S. 13 (1928). In that case, the Court held that because a New Jersey statutory scheme for
notice to out-of-state residents did not require the constitutionally mandated notice by mail, the mailed

notice that was actually sent did not meet due process requirements. Id.
119. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
120. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
121. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 245-46 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent correctly pointed out the majority's move
toward the ad hoc balancing that Dusenbery had explicitly rejected in choosing to apply Mullane and not
Mathews. Id. at 243-44. Although neither the dissent nor the majority opinion in Jones mentioned
Mathews by name, the majority clearly emphasized the need for case-by-case balancing of
constitutionally significant interests to evaluate every follow-up measure available. Id. at 229 (majority
opinion). Unfortunately, the dissent's simple-rule alternative eliminates any inquiry into appropriate
follow-up actions in response to a returned mailing. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
124. Id. at 229-3 1.
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adequacy of follow-up efforts, the Jones Court tugged hard on a loose
thread that threatens to unravel the entire weave that is the mailed notice
system. But, the majority opinion also recognized the dangers of having
specific application of such balancing used to second-guess a wide
variety of tax foreclosures.
The majority opinion declined to impose an obligation on tax
foreclosure plaintiffs to seek out additional addresses even when the
information they have tells them that notification will not occur without
such a search. 125 The Court found that the Commissioner in Jones did
not face such a choice, since the envelopes returned as "unclaimed" left
open the possibility that another form of delivery at the subject address
might succeed in notifying the owner.1 26 The opinion went on to state
that:
An open-ended search for a new address-especially when the State
obligates the taxpayer to keep his address updated with the tax
collector... -imposes burdens on the State significantly greater than the
several relatively easy options [of posting the notice at the subject
property or resending it by regular mail to the owner and/or occupant].
The Jones Court sidestepped the troubling question of what the
Commissioner should have done if and when he discovered that Jones
no longer resided at the subject property. It did not, however, close the
door on the possibility that a tax foreclosure plaintiff's knowledge of
failure to notify a28 stakeholder could necessitate a search for other
mailing addresses.'
By using the construction of the "desirous of actually informing"
notice provider to create its follow-up requirement, Jones extended the
cost-benefit calculation from the initial choice of the system of
notification to the physical delivery of notice and, inevitably, to locating
and identifying interest holders as well. 129 As the majority opinion in
Jones noted, courts are already divided on this important issue of a
search for alternate mailing addresses. 130 While Jones can be read to
125. Id. at 235-36.
126. Id. at 234-35.
127. Id. at 236 (internal citations omitted).
128. Id.
129. For an application of"desirous of actually informing" to notice in class action suits, see Todd
B. Hilsee, Gina M. Intrepido & Shannon R. Wheatman, Hurricanes, Mobility and Due Process: The
"Desire to Inform" Requirement is Highlighted by Katrina,80 TUL. L. REV. 1771 (2006).
130. Jones, 547 U.S. at 225. Compare, Akey v. Clinton County, 375 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2004)

("In light of the notice's return, the County was required to use 'reasonably diligent efforts' to ascertain
Akey's correct address." (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 n.4 (1983))),
and Kennedy v. Mossafa, 789 N.E.2d 607, 611 (N.Y. 2003) ("[W]e reject the view that the enforcing
officer's obligation is always satisfied by sending the notice to the address listed in the tax roll, even
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support those courts that have refused to impose a follow-up address
search requirement,
its balancing test puts those decisions on shaky
131
ground.
The problem with the Jones Court's use of the fiduciary approach lies
not with the standard itself. 132 Rather, the confusion and unpredictability
that Jones is causing' 33 stems from its application of a standard, one that
is both demanding and open-ended, to the particular notification
decisions made by those initiating the foreclosure. Substantively,
Jones's use of the desirous of actually informing standard will lead to
such demanding due diligence in notice by mail that mailed notice will
become functionally equivalent to personal service. Procedurally, Jones
imposes the difficult task of applying this open-ended standard on the
lawyers, paralegals and clerks who must daily face the decision of how
to respond to a known failure to notify. The doctrinal, or meta-doctrinal,
problems confronted here are-at root-controversies concerning the
choice between standards and rules as appropriate modes of legal
reasoning. To understand the unsatisfactory nature of the alternatives
that the majority and the minority opinions in Jones offer, we first need
to examine them both in light of the theoretical understanding of rules
and standards as complementary and competing forms of legal
reasoning.

where the notice is returned as undeliverable."), with Smith v. Cliffs on the Bay Condominium Ass'n,
617 N.W.2d 536, 541 (Mich. 2000) (per curiam), abrogatedby Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006)
("The fact that one of the mailings was returned by the post office as undeliverable does not impose on
the state the obligation to undertake an investigation to see if a new address.., could be located."). See
infra note 133.
13 1. The direct application of a cost-benefit standard to a particular notification decision makes it
inevitable that some form of alternate address search will be required. Ready access to address and
identity information on the Internet makes it ever harder to ignore opportunities to find current mailing
addresses for respondents in tax foreclosure proceedings. For example, Accurint can identify mailing
addresses with unique identifiers such as date of birth and social security number. See Accurint,
http://www.accurint.com (last visited July 16, 2008). As attorneys for unsecured creditors make
resources like these everyday tools for locating debtors so as to establish in personam jurisdiction, it will
become more and more difficult for foreclosure petitioners to claim that they should not be required to
use such tools as part of their diligent search efforts.
132. Mennonite Boardof Missions also invoked the "desirous of actually informing" standard in
evaluating the state of Indiana's systemic decision to not offer any direct notice of tax sales to affected
mortgagees. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
133. Although Jones explicitly avoided a finding that the Commissioner was required to engage in
a secondary address search, two cases that held that secondary address searches are not required are now
recognized as being abrogated by Jones. Elizondo v. Read, 588 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ind. 1992), abrogated
by Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2005); Smith v. Cliffs on the Bay Condominium Ass'n, 617 N.W.2d
536, 541 (Mich. 2000) (per curiam), abrogatedby Jones, 547 U.S. at 220.
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2. Rules and Standards
Normative principles designed to govern conduct are generally
expressed either as rules or as standards.' 34 Rules condition and express
their directives in factual terms that require a minimum of normative
judgment by those who interpret them.' 35 They draw lines between what
is permitted and what is forbidden.' 36 Rules express answers to moral
questions; standards, on the other hand, tend to use normative terms
such as "reasonable" or "diligent" in describing the scope of sanctioned
behavior. Such a word or phrase often acts as an embedded question,
such as "What is reasonable under these circumstances?" These singular
norms frequently comprise and balance competing concerns, disguising
indeterminacy, if not outright self-contradiction. Standards express
moral judgments,' 37 but not in the purely descriptive terms to which
Standards flexibly summarize relevant moral
rules aspire.
139
considerations, 138 whereas rules offer "entrenched generalization[s].'
Rules often generate normative outcomes that differ from those that
would be produced by thoughtful application of the justifications they
seek to promote. 140 They can be overinclusive. That is, they can prohibit
behavior that the underlying moral principles would, if properly applied,
permit. 14 1 Likewise, rules-sometimes the same rules that tend towards
overinclusion-can, in other circumstances, also be underinclusive.
by persons
Their rigidity and simplicity allow them to be evaded
142
exploiting loopholes and engaging in sham compliance.
134. Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin describe the distinction as follows:
Rules are legal norms that are formal and mechanical. They are triggered by a few easily
identified factual matters and are opaque in application to the values that they are
designed to serve. Standards, on the other hand are flexible, content-sensitive legal norms
that require evaluative judgments in their application. A paradigmatic standard is "Drive
Safely."
LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 158 (2001).

135. Id.
136. Or if they are affirmative rules, between what actions are required and what are discretionary.
137. In this way, the standard, "One should act reasonably" differs, arguably, from the moral
tautology, "One should do that which one should do."
138. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 134 at 158.
139. For a discussion of rules as entrenched generalizations, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING
BYTHE RULES, 78, 77-111 (1991).
140. Id. at31-34.
141. Id. As discussed above, this overinclusiveness can be seen as a benefit when an underlying
moral principle such as general welfare maximization is faulted for permitting atrocities. The tendency
of a rule to be overly restrictive can also be beneficial in cases where those applying a standard would be
tempted into being excessively casual and generate underinclusive results.
142. The development of adequate notice doctrine illustrates many of these points. Pennoyer's
bright-line rule concerning constructive notice for in rem matters contributed to the abuse of attachment
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3. Jones as the Displacement of Rules in Favor of Standards
By recasting the substantive critique in the theoretical language of
rules and standards, we can see that Jones's application of the "desirous
to actually inform" standard opens the door to overprotection of the right
to adequate notice. Under the majority's approach, every failure to
engage in some reasonable act that might have led to notification is
judged in isolation from all the steps that were previously taken but
known to have failed. 143 Just as rules tend to generalize and ignore
possibly relevant differences, standards involve case-by-case balancing,
which tends to focus on the individual case to the neglect of the bigger
picture. 144 In Jones, the decision whether or not to take another followup step is framed as a choice between notice by mail and notice by
publication. 145 By defining each follow-up decision as the choice
between meaningful and illusory respect for the notice recipient's due
process rights, courts replicate the same kind of conceptual severance
that has led some takings analyses to treat nearly every diminution of
146
land value as an abrogation of a particularized property right.

jurisdiction. By limiting direct notification to cases involving in personam relief, notice formalism failed
to protect the participation rights of many out-of-state defendants. Likewise, a rule that does not
contemplate universal mail service or a national economy increasingly centered around intangible
property cannot maintain its relevance in the twentieth century. Pennoyer's rule was superseded-not by
an updated, more complex rule but-by a general standard that transcended particular
telecommunication systems and modes of business dealing. Even as that general standard took on shape
in rules that required mailed notice, or the like, to affected parties when feasible, new questions about
how a mailed system would be implemented were answered by a return to standards in Jones. See supra
Part I.B-C.
143. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
144. Frederick Schauer uses lessons learned from cognitive psychology to illustrate the extent to
which case-by-case adjudication may distort doctrine. He argues that these biases go beyond Holmes's
statement that "[g]reat cases like hard cases make bad law." Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad
Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006) (citation omitted).
145. Jones, 547 U.S. at 229-33. The Jones majority defended its picking apart of notification
lapses without drawing a bright line past which follow-up procedures would be adequate despite known
failure. "As noted, '[it is not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that the [government]
should adopt."' Id. at 240 (citation omitted). It is true that courts are not suited to fashioning effective
notification systems. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. But, if the courts disregard
legislated follow-up procedures when they are known to have failed, courts will be preventing
legislatures and judicial administrative bodies from creating rules that can provide complying parties
assurance that their actions are constitutional.
146. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674-78 (1988).
[Conceptual severance in the takings context] consists of delineating a property interest
consisting of just what the government action has removed from the owner, and then
asserting that that particular whole thing has been permanently taken. Thus, this strategy
hypothetically or conceptually "severs" from the whole bundle of rights just those strands
that are interfered with by the regulation, and then hypothetically or conceptually
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Instead of a respondent having a single right to a reasonably
implemented system of mailed notice, the Jones analysis is leading
courts to confer upon the party facing foreclosure an indefinite series of
rights to a variety of cost-effective steps that could lead to actual
notice. 147 The known failure to achieve actual delivery by certified mail
triggers the right to notice by regular mail. If and when that regular
mailing apparently fails to achieve actual notice, then posting on the
property may become required. If the visit to the property leads to
information that the person to be notified resides elsewhere, then the
decision to search for other addresses becomes just another iteration of
the choice between direct notification and constructive notice by
publication. If, as Jones suggests, known failure renders all prior efforts
irrelevant, 148 the decision whether or not to follow-up on a failed attempt
at direct notification is nothing more and nothing less than the original
choice between a meaningful attempt to achieve actual notice and the
"mere gesture"' 149 of constructive notice.
In isolation from one another, none of the steps above are likely to
present costs out of proportion to the possible gain of achieving actual
notice. Thus, a court asked to review a failure to take a particular followup action may apply Mullane's cost-benefit standard and find the failed
notification efforts to be constitutionally inadequate under Jones. Even
when the set of possible follow-up measures are considered in the
aggregate, the total amount of time and money invested would probably
not be prohibitive. But, the atomized analysis of each and every possibly
cost-effective means of providing direct notification makes the followup requirements exhaustive without any clear guidance as to when
feasible methods have been exhausted. The foreclosing party cannot
identify, with any confidence whatsoever, that it has satisfied all the
obligations imposed upon it for achieving direct notification and can
move forward with the foreclosure despite its knowledge that it has
failed to achieve actual notice.
Jones may not lead all interpreting courts to conclude that all known
failures to achieve direct notification must be second-guessed as to the
construes those strands in the aggregate as a separate whole thing.
Id. at 1676.
147. See, e.g., Luessenhop v. Clinton County, 466 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that
knowledge of failure to notify requires foreclosing petitioner to inquire as to the existence of any
practicable steps that might achieve actual notice).

148. The majority opinion in Jones emphasizes the connection between known failure and
complete nullification of the attempt by comparing the sender's receipt of the certified letter as
"unclaimed" to the sender watching the postman throw his posted letter into the sewer. Jones, 547 U.S.
at 229.
149. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
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possibility of some cost-effective step not attempted.150 Apart from its
distorting effect on the expectations of foreclosing petitioners, the direct
application of the "desirous of actually informing" standard also places
procedural burdens on those actually making the decisions of how to
effect notice of tax foreclosure proceedings. Even if the standards could
51
be applied without flaw by judges in compelling individual cases,
Jones's implicit expectation that those initiating tax foreclosure
proceedings will be able to anticipate those judgments places these
practitioners in a difficult position. First, they have limited knowledge of
the relevant facts. Even if the courts maintain their commitment to
evaluating notification decisions from the ex ante perspective of those
attempting notice, many questions remain regarding the availability of
relevant resources.1 52 Second, these practitioners have limited
knowledge of the vague and changing law in this matter. Some are
lawyers, but many are clerks with no training that would allow them to
appreciate, for instance, the courts' various appraisals of the
comparative effectiveness of certified and regular mail. Third, their
decisions will always be suspect because they are 'fiduciaries' that
often, if not always, have conflicts of interest with the notice recipients
they are charged to look out for. Far from being given the benefit of the
doubt, they will be often be assumed to be less than motivated in their
efforts to provide actual notice.15 3 These practitioners, then, make for
poor managers of the uncertainty engendered by the "desirous of
actually informing" formulation of the Mullane reasonableness standard.
They need guidance not only to avoid sometimes paralyzing doubt, but
also to help them promote
the core value of participation underlying
154
requirements.
notice
150. Soon after Jones was decided, the Supreme Court, without hearing argument, vacated and

remanded the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Estate of Lowe ex rel. Harris v. Apex Tax
Investments, Inc. for reconsideration of the matter in light of the Jones holding. 547 U.S. 1145 (2006)
(mem.). In its original decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a purchasing tax investor's known
failure to notify the owner of an unoccupied property did not invalidate its title. In re Application of
County Collector, 838 N.E.2d 907 (Ill. 2005). Upon remand, the Illinois Supreme Court reasserted its
prior position and held that the possible availability of information that the owner was incapacitated and
resided in a nearby mental health care facility did not impose a duty to investigate on the party taking
title. In re Application of County Collector, 867 N.E.2d 941(111. 2007), cert den'd 128 S.Ct. 253 (2007)
(mem.).
151. See supra note 144.
152. Rules can play a coordinating role by conveying information from experts about standard
resources and best practices. Rules can also provide an opportunity to those receiving notice to put
themselves in a better position to receive notification. For more about the ability of rules to coordinate
activity, see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 134, at 14-15; SCHAUER, supra note 139, at 162-66.
See also infra note 223.
153. See supra note 84.
154. For a discussion of how appropriate rules governing secondary address searches can give
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Such a two-fold condemnation of the aggressive application of
Mullane's fiduciary standard to follow-up decisions would apparently
compel agreement with the three dissenting justices in Jones.1 55 The
dissent in Jones, however, recognized the overly aggressive use of
standards, but did not offer a promising alternative. Justice Thomas
argued in favor of an ex ante perspective locked into the moment of the
sending of the notice. The dissent's position would eliminate any review
of follow-up decisions. It would make the mere creation of a mailed
notice system a safe harbor. Under such a strict limitation of the Mullane
standard, the courts would be able to confirm that a notice by mail
system was in use but would lack any ability to look at how it was being
implemented. Transforming the Mennonite rule requiring the mailing of
a notice from a necessary condition to a per se sufficient condition for
constitutional adequacy could sanction the denial of meaningful notice
efforts in a wide range of circumstances.1 56 The dissent is correct in
charging that the majority's directive regarding failed notice attempts
"has no natural end point, and, in effect, requires the States to achieve
something close to actual notice."' 157 It does not follow, however, that
the result in Jones was wrong. If a reasonableness standard, particularly
one couched in the language of fiduciary obligations, cannot provide the
finality needed, then the Court should look to another formulation of
Mullane's test for adequate notice to validate a rule or set of rules that
offers both access to legal relief for petitioners and fairness to affected
parties.
F. "Reasonably Certain to Inform" as a Standardfor Constitutional
Safe Harbors
Legal scholarship concerning judicial decision-making has generally
presented well-defined rules and flexible balancing tests as opposite

foreclosing petitioners usefil information as to how to locate a respondent to a foreclosure action, see
supra note 152 and infra note 223.
155. Jones was decided by a 5-3 vote (Justice Alito took no part in the decision or consideration
of the case) with Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy in dissent. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220
(2006).
156. The Jones case provides a good example. From the Commissioner's ex ante perspective,
Jones was a homeowner who was going to be deprived of his home without actual notice. The
Commissioner may have succeeded in providing notice merely by sending the exact same letter by an

even less expensive method than had already been tried. Under the dissent's approach, even this simple
follow-up step would not have been constitutionally mandated.
157. Jones, 547 U.S. at 244.
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poles on a continuous spectrum of forms of legal reasoning.1 58 Between
the bright-line rule of Pennoyer's broad exemption from personal
service for in rem cases and Jones's cost-benefit analysis of every
possible follow-up option lay a number of legal reasoning approaches
that can be used to strike an appropriate "meta-balance.' ' 159 In
confronting the case of the notice provider who knowingly abandons
direct notification after formal compliance with written requirements,
the Jones majority invoked Mullane in its move toward a step-by-step
cost-benefit analysis. The desirous notice provider construct,
unmediated by comprehensible guidelines, has the potential to dissolve
every tax title obtained by a foreclosing party that knew or should have
known that actual notice had not been accomplished. 160 Mullane,
however, contains additional language that courts can use to support and
manage the creation of constitutional safe harbors.
Just after the passage describing the "desirous" notice provider, the
Mullane Court offered a two-tiered analysis of adequate notice:
The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen
method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably
certain to inform those affected, or, where conditions do not reasonably
permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely161to
bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.
The Court stated a goal of reasonable certainty to which all notification
procedures should aspire but do not necessarily have to achieve in order
to be considered "reasonably calculated ... to apprise."', 62 A notice
system that is "reasonably certain to inform" those affected would be per
se constitutionally valid. 163 In situations where such a system is not
practicable, the Court urged a method that is not clearly inferior to other
feasible means. 164 The Mullane Court's division of its own test into
higher and lower standards offers an opportunity for courts to declare
well-constructed notification protocols so comprehensively effective, so
"reasonably certain to inform," as to assure all complying parties of the
constitutional adequacy of their notification efforts, even if they are

158. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 61-62 (1992); James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on
the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1995).
159. Wilson, supranote 158, at 773-78.

160. See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
161. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted).
162. Id.at314.
163. Id. at 315.
164. Id.
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65

ultimately unsuccessful. 1
Courts can and should apply the "reasonably certain" standard to
induce legislatures to devise detailed protocols that adequately address
the follow-up issues likely to arise in carrying out notice by mail. If a
direct notification system, judged as a whole, contains adequate
consideration for appropriate follow-up measures, then foreclosing
jurisdictions and title insurers can rely on it in making their own due
diligence determinations. When regulators face the question of how to
manage the vagueness of a statutorily created facts and circumstances
test, they often address the need for predictability by offering adherents
safe harbor, a more clearly defined and generally more restrictive set of
requirements that ensure a finding of compliance.' 66 In the wake of the
Jones decision, interpreting courts should afford legislatures the
opportunity to create notification follow-up protocols that are
sufficiently detailed as to guarantee constitutionally valid notice.
1. Safe Harbors in Constitutional Jurisprudence
The experience with and scholarship on safe harbors offers three
reasons to look to them as a way of finding a proper "meta-balance"
between rules and standards in the context of procedural due process.
First, in their basic form, they promote greater efficiency without
weakening
compliance
restrictions
by
being
intentionally
67
overinclusive.
Regulatory agencies have turned to the safe harbor
approach to give clear guidance when charged with the specification and
enforcement of broad statutory standards. To most closely delimit the
actual contours of a vague standard, an agency will promulgate
regulations that offer a facts and circumstances test designed to inform
regulated parties of the various factual issues that the agency will focus
on in determining compliance with the standard. But, the agency
supplements the list of relevant factors with a separate safe harbor track.
The rule-based alternative produces a precise measuring stick by which
68
affected organizations can assure themselves of their own compliance.'

165. Although the author is unaware of any prior cases in which a court has used the "reasonably
certain to inform" standard to declare a notification system adequate per se, the Supreme Court has cited
this language to show that even a system that is clearly adequate need not guarantee actual notice.
166. For example, Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin Goldman have recently proposed the use of
safe harbors to give needed predictability to the fair use doctrine. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A.
Goldman, Fair Use Harbors,93 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2007).

167. Overinclusive, here and throughout, denotes a rule that is comparatively more restrictive and
more protective of a fundamental value-in this case, the right to be notified of proceeding affecting
one's rights in property.
168. For instance, the Internal Revenue Service, in interpreting Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
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The bright-line rule gives certainty to those groups that can comply with
it. Others can turn to the broader but less well-defined facts and
circumstances test. Second, as discussed below, safe harbors have
already been used by the Supreme Court in the context of unreasonable
search and seizure doctrine to deal with the need for guidance as to
constitutional standards. Third, when a complete set of stabilizing rules
is needed, the guardian of a constitutional standard can be a gatekeeper,
as opposed to creator, of constitutional safe harbors. The courts need not
generate the safe harbor notification protocols themselves, but can
instead set out a standard which challenges other rulemaking bodies to
craft detailed procedures that provide finality while assuring there will
be no violation of due process rights.
Although the rare scholarly 1 69 and judicial 170 references to the phrase
"constitutional safe harbor" have tended to be occasions for skepticism,
one commentator has recognized the utility of the constitutional safe
harbor, at least when it is properly constrained. In the context of
constitutional criminal procedure, Susan Klein not only identifies
particular examples of the judicially created constitutional safe harbor
but also sketches a brief theory of its parameters. 171 The Fourth
Amendment safe harbors she describes outline certain criminal-suspect
search procedures and types of searches that effectively preclude 172a
viable critical inquiry into the particular circumstances of the search.

Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006), has included "relief of the poor, and distressed" as a

charitable purpose qualifying an organization for federal income tax exemption. 26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)1(d) (2008). This regulation, while offering some degree of helpful specificity, still operates at the level

of broad generalities. Nonprofit organizations providing safe, decent affordable housing to those unable
to meet their needs in the local private real estate market would understandably want more definitive
guidance as to whether or not their activities for development of affordable rental and homeownership
units would qualify as charitable activities. In 1996, the Service released further regulatory direction.

Revenue Procedure 96-32 offered both a facts and circumstances test and a safe harbor provision. Rev.
Proc. 96-32, 1996-20 I.R.B. 14. The latter requires that the housing developments created by qualifying
organizations dedicate certain percentages to households that are low-income and below. 26 C.F.R.
601.201 (2008). The percentages are fixed and the qualifying incomes are calculated based on the Area
Median Income (AMI) for the relevant locality. The safe harbor builds in indices to match varying local
economies, giving it important flexibility, without losing any of the descriptive precision which makes it

"safe."
169. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planningas Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 444 (2007)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), as
effectively exempting from "public use" scrutiny those eminent domain condemnations that have
undergone a public planning process).
170. See, e.g., Santa Fe Ind. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (finding that the defendant
school district's superficial changes to its public prayer policies did not afford it "constitutional safe
harbor").
171. Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)FormulatingProphylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
IncidentalRights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030 (2001).

172. Id. at 1044-47.
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These protected searches are deemed to be per se reasonable. To show
these safe harbors to be properly entrenched generalizations, Klein
demonstrates that they have been faithfully applied even when they part
ways with the considerations that gave rise to them. 173 In protecting the
constitutional freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, the Court
has been willing to tolerate a rule that is, at least to some extent,
underinclusive.
Klein is quick to point out that the Court is rightly reluctant to extend
safe harbor protection in the realm of constitutional rights. 174 Klein
offers two preconditions for the employment of a constitutional safe
harbor. First, it must be demonstrated that the traditional method of
adjudicating the constitutional issue on a case-by-case basis is not
feasible. 75 Second, the costs imposed
by the use of the constitutional
76
1
acceptable.
be
must
harbor
safe
Although Klein devotes little or no explicit attention to the defense of
these propositions, this Article's discussion of constitutional rules and
standards provides significant support for each of them. Rules that
protect constitutional rights can provide enough efficiency through their
clarity to justify any overinclusion that might result. But, the risk of
underinclusion raises the need for greater caution. A constitutional safe
harbor rule should not trump a less determinate, but more accurate,
standard unless the application of that standard is intolerably
indeterminate. 177 Even when the true need for the creation of a
constitutional safe harbor has been demonstrated, the risk of
underinclusion must be strictly limited. Safe harbor rules cannot be valid
if they sanction blatant violations of a constitutional norm.1 78 Moreover,
173. Id. The rule sanctioning a police officer's search of a suspect's grab area incident to a valid
arrest has its justification in the need for a police officer to feel protected against sudden violent action
by the suspect. Id. at 1045 n.66 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). The Supreme Court
found it necessary to give clear rules validating all searches of containers and vehicle passenger

compartment areas because it did not want to impose the need for interpretation of a less well-defined
standard while in a situation of possible personal danger. As a consequence, the Court followed the rule
even in cases where the searches would not have been validated by direct application of the underlying
standard rule. Klein, supra note 171, at 1044-47.
174. Id. at 1046-47 nn. 75,76 (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000); Richards v.

Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997)).
175. Klein, supra note 171, at 1033.

176. Id. Klein illustrates this latter point in a diagram at the end of the article. She states that
underinclusion in the context of a basic right will be as small as possible in a well-designed
constitutional safe harbor rule. Id. at 1080.
177. On this issue, I agree with Klein's implication that a constitutional safe harbor rule must
address a substantial need for increased certainty. In the cases dealing with search incident to arrest, a
vague standard's aggravation of the necessity for spot decision-making compromised officer safety. See
supra note 171.
178. See supra note 156 and accompanying text; cf Klein, supra note 171, at 1046.
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those instances in which the safe harbor rule is acceptably more
permissive than the unworkable standard would be must be justified by
the benefits of certainty brought about by the use of the safe harbor.
2. A Standard for Rules that Preempt Standards
These two criteria inform the content of Mullane's "super standard"
of "reasonably certain to inform." To be granted the protective abilities
of a constitutional safe harbor, a detailed notification protocol should
consist of directives that would protect against any outright denial of
adequate notice.' 79 It must provide this guarantee for all circumstances
contemplated within its categorical limits.' 80 It also must balance any
downward departures from the general adequacy of notice standard with
the gains of coordination, predictability and efficiency associated with
well-defined instructions. In certain instances, a "reasonably certain"
follow-up protocol may not allow for any outcome that would be found
inadequate under the general standard.' 8 1 In cases where such a
demanding rule would not be practicable, a promulgated set of
"reasonably certain" notification protocols could protect a notification
attempt that complied with the rule but resulted in known failure despite
the possibility 82of another means of follow-up that could have achieved
actual notice.'
Rules are, by their nature, "suboptimal" approaches to normative
articulation. 183 Advance directives about how foreclosing petitioners
should respond to known failures to identify, locate, or deliver notice to
foreclosure respondents must be sufficiently tailored to relevant
circumstances to eliminate unacceptably permissive outcomes without
resorting to the indeterminate language of standards. One single rule for
how to respond to a returned mailing is not likely to suffice for the many
different contexts that require such a response. The courts have been

179. In order to be declared a constitutional safe harbor, a follow-up protocol would have to pass a
test that is the real opposite of the standard for facial constitutional challenges announced in U.S. v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Where the Supreme Court has held that, in general, a statute will not be
found unconstitutional on its face unless "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid", Id. at 745, the "reasonably certain to inform" test would look to all possibilities within the scope
of the protocol to rule out the possibility of invalid application.
180. As articulated infra in Part 1II, the categories are generated by mapping the three types of
direct notification failure, see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text, against appropriately defined
types of property interest holders, see infra Part III.A-B.
181. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.l ("reasonably certain" follow-up to failed notice to homeowner
would involve actual delivery of notice to subject property.).
182. See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
183. SCHAUER, supra note 139, at 100-02.
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able to fashion workable safe harbors in the Fourth Amendment context
from the relatively frequent challenges made to evidence obtained
through controversial police searches. Balancing the need for officer
safety with the constitutional rights of criminal defendants has required
not just one entrenched generalization but several. 184 The rigidity of
rules and the attendant problems of inaccuracy 185 are exacerbated in the
judicial context because courts must wait for the cases to come before
them in order to shape a comprehensive doctrine. In the context of
adequate notice of proceedings, appellate decisions are less common and
provide fewer occasions for judicial creation of safe harbors. The lack of
opportunities to fine tune constitutional safe harbors decrease the
likelihood that courts could deploy workable rules that adequately
protect constitutional rights.
Those creating a rule should not attempt to subject a great variety of
cases to it; rules should be properly tailored. A safe harbor approach to
notification protocols needs to be multi-faceted. The courts, as passive
auditors of disputes brought before them, cannot efficiently construct
such a system. Legislatures and judicial administrative bodies should
enact tax foreclosure notification procedures with sufficient detail to
resolve these questions of proper follow-up to failed notification
attempts. Because legislatures, courts, and tax administrators are already
writing out notification requirements for both judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosure processes, these bodies would be the natural sources of
constitutional safe harbors. To do so, they would need to consciously
draft protocols for the purpose of protecting compliant actions from
destabilizing constitutional review. In crafting these protocols, these
rulemaking bodies would become interpreters of the constitutional
86
protections afforded persons affected by foreclosure actions.,
Following Mennonite's one-size-fits-all approach, legislatures could
try to construct a single system for follow-up notification that would
apply equally to all interested parties with substantial property interests.
Such a set of protocols would have the advantage of simplicity.
Notification procedures that make no provision for how to address
returned mailings and subsequently acquired information are already
difficult to understand. Even with no differentiation among types of
stakeholders, enacted protocols would have to separately address follow-

184. Klein, supranote 171, at 1044-47.
185. For discussion of rules' under- and over-inclusiveness, see supra notes 140-42 and
accompanying text. See also, SCHAUER, supranote 139, at 31-34.
186. For a discussion of the legislative and executive branches as interpreters of constitutional
law, see Edward A. Harnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, FacialChallenges
and the ComparativeCompetence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735 (2006).
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up mechanisms for identification of, location of, and delivery to
interested parties. 187 Because simple rules better convey information to
would-be adherents than more complex ones, legislatures 88should enact
specialized rules only when they provide some advantage.'
If policymakers wish to tailor rules to apply to a subset of interested
parties, they should make the classifying criteria as clear and simple as
possible. Tailoring follow-up notification protocols to match different
types of stakeholders justifies the cost of complexity in two ways. First,
specified secondary efforts rules will allow legislators to afford different
levels of certainty in notification to various groups of interest holders.
Even though all stakeholders receive the basic entitlement of direct
notification provided for by Mennonite, certain groups may justly expect
especially rigorous supplemental procedures. The Jones Court realized
the relevance of this distinction, remarking on the "important and
irreversible.., loss" that Jones faced in foreclosure of his house. 189 The
Commissioner's knowledge of the kind of interest Jones held imposed
an especially high burden on the Commissioner with regard to assuring
actual notice. 190 Second, certain strategies for supplementing basic
notice by mail may work particularly well with certain stakeholders.
91
Even if mail works fairly well for all types of affected parties,'
foreclosing attorneys whose initial attempts at notice fail should take
into account information about the type of stakeholder when pursuing
appropriate follow-up measures. Mullane recognized the continuing
relevance of stakeholder vigilance in constructing adequate notice. The
rise of the mails as the dominant mode of foreclosure notice has made
affected parties very passive partners in the notification process.
Nevertheless, understanding the general nature and the mechanics of
stakeholder interaction with property can give us an understanding of the
extent and focus of follow-up protocols.

187. For instance, in anticipation of a foreclosing party receiving a returned mailing indicating
that the sole owner of record for the property is deceased, the legislature could provide for a follow-up
search of probate records to determine the existence of an administered estate and the identity of the new
party to receive notice. Some jurisdictions provide for this as part of the initial title search to identify
and locate the persons entitled to notice. See, e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-836(b) (West
2008).
188. See Kaplow, supra note 26, at 590-93.
189. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 230 (2006).
190. Id.
191. 1 argue below that mail is becoming less effective for mortgagees who are increasingly
dependent on the Internet for information regarding their holdings. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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III. TAILORING TAx FORECLOSURE NOTIFICATION PROTOCOLS

A. Protocolsfor "Reasonably Certain" Notification
Thirty-five years ago, in an article entitled Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral (the Cathedral),
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed introduced a tripartite
taxonomy of property rights classified by the types of protection legal
institutions offered to protect them.' 92 Inalienable entitlements could not
be separated from their holders, not even by voluntary transfer for
value. 193 Rights protected by liability rules, on the other hand, could be
taken away, even involuntarily, but appropriate compensation would be
due. 194 Property rule entitlements were protected not by a mere damages
award but by specific injunction, and thus could be transferred only with
95
the consent of the holder.'
In the language of the Cathedral, the process of tax sale and
foreclosure provides the liability rule liquidation of the property rule
entitlements held by the affected interest holders. The owners' failure to
pay property taxes on time puts their ownership entitlements, as well as
the lien interests of their secured creditors, at risk. But, as long as any of
these parties has a right of redemption, that stakeholder can preserve his
or her interest by curing the delinquency. To finalize transfer of title, the
equity of redemption of all stakeholders is foreclosed out and they are
left with the surplus proceeds of the tax sale, if any. Like other liability
rule mechanisms, tax sale and foreclosure convert in-kind entitlements
to monetary values.
Foreclosure provides an example of property rules giving way to
liability rules. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have given the
name "pliability rules" to processes that move across the boundaries
between property and liability rule realms.196 Foreclosure, as a pliability
rule structure, offers property rule entitlement holders one final chance
to preserve their interests in-kind. When stakeholders fail to redeem,
they face the liquidation of their interests by a liability rule mechanism
designed to pay off the underlying debt and distribute any surplus. While
a foreclosure sale may seem to be only a liability rule mechanism, its
attention to interested parties' rights of redemption shows it to actually

192.
One View
193.
194.
195.
196.

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
Id. at 1092-93.
Id. at 1092.
See id.
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parehomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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be a pliability rule mechanism. The strength of the right of redemption
depends upon timely notice by the foreclosing jurisdiction to
stakeholders of its expiration. A foreclosure process that insistently
imposes an open-ended commitment to actual notice gives stronger
property rule protection for affected parties' rights in the subject parcel.
To the extent that a right of redemption must bow to the need for
practicable notification standards, liability rule liquidation becomes the
respondents' remaining safeguard.
Pliability rule mechanisms can bring just and efficient balance when a
property rights system must contend with dysfunctional property rule
entitlements. 197 The gridlock caused by excessive fractionation requires
resort to a liquidation mechanism such as eminent domain.' 98 Unlimited
use of such a powerful liability rule process, however, can itself hamper
investment by depriving landowners of security of tenure.
When property owners fail to stay current on secured debts their
property rights become less stable. Uncertainty about their abilities to
retain their property rights will limit their willingness to invest in those
properties. They may abandon their properties altogether, even before
foreclosure proceedings begin. Foreclosure does not create the
delinquency or the title insecurity that follows; rather, it culminates in
cutting off the interests of those in default. But, properties may also be
redeemed by full payment of the tax delinquencies. While the essential
goal of foreclosure is finality, that end can be served just as well by
redemption as it can by dissolution.
Notice in foreclosure proceedings is the indispensable first step in
protecting the equity of redemption. The length of time afforded to an
owner or other redeeming party to cure the delinquency may ultimately
determine the strength of the right, but, without notice of the opportunity
to exercise the right, it has little effectiveness. Because notice is so
important to the legitimacy of the foreclosure process, its success in
achieving finality depends on compliance with notification
requirements. Failure to give adequate notice of a tax foreclosure creates
the very title insecurity that foreclosure, as a pliability rule mechanism,
is designed to resolve.
Chief Justice Roberts implicitly recognized the distinctive importance

197. See id. at 31-32.
198. Michael Heller has identified the problem caused by overlapping rights of exclusion as the
"tragedy of the anticommons." Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 11 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622 (1998); see also MICHAEL HELLER, THE
GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION AND
COSTS LIVES (2008); Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together:
Experimental Evidence ofAnticommons Tragedies, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 1 (2006).
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of foreclosure notice to owners, as opposed to mortgagees and judgment
lien creditors, when he wrote in Jones that the reasonability of follow-up
notification was especially apparent when "the subject matter...
concerns such an important and irreversible prospect as the loss of a
house."' 199 The in-kind entitlement of land ownership, especially
homeownership, is particularly and irreparably vulnerable to foreclosure
in a way in which security interests are not.20 0 Land is unique-no one
parcel is absolutely identical to another. For many absentee owners, land
holdings are fungible commodities; a property in one location can be
replaced by a similar parcel in a different location having identical
investment features. Conversely, homeowners, although also concerned
with resale values, tend to value particular details about their homes and
may not be easily amenable to substitutes, especially by involuntary
dispossession. 2 0 1 Loss of the property may deprive them of a sense of
place and membership in their community.20 2 Even an adequate
liquidation process--one that gives homeowners fair value for their
property-can never return to them what they have lost.
By focusing on categories of property interest holders, legislators can
not only address the general question of how extensively to follow up,
but also how to focus the secondary search efforts of foreclosing parties.
Although the caretaker principle may seem like an excuse for not
making any substantial efforts to personally notify owners of seized
property, it does support a system that at least attempts to strike a
balance between the needs of the foreclosing and the foreclosed. With
the basic right to direct notification well-established, policymakers
should be free to design supplemental processes that reflect the different
kinds of vigilance they can and should expect from stakeholders. As we
will see when discussing mortgagees, an exploration of the ways in
which mortgagees manage their business affairs may eventually lead
notification away from mailed notice altogether.

199. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 230 (2006).
200. For more in-depth treatment of the special legal status
of the home, see D. Benjamin Barros,
Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006).
201. James J. Kelly, Jr., "We Shall Not Be Moved": Urban Communities, Eminent Domain and
the Socioeconomics ofJust Compensation, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 923 (2006).
202. See MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: How TEARING UP CITY NEIGHBORHOODS
HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2004); Marc A. Fried, Grievingfor a Lost Home:
Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD & THE CONTROVERSY 359-79
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1966); Marisela B. Gomez & Carlos Muntaner, Urban Redevelopment and
NeighborhoodHealth in East Baltimore, Maryland: The Role of Institutionaland Communitarian Social
Capital, 15 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 83 (2005); Mindy Thompson Fullilove, PsychiatricImplications of
Displacement: Contributionsfrom the Psychology of Place, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1516 (1996); Lee
Rainwater, Fearand the House-as-Haven in the Lower Class, 32 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 23 (1966).
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B. Owners: Stabilizing Notice by Mail
A properly tailored protocol for owners would most likely have a
single standard for following up on information about the death of an
owner or dissolution. Just as returned mailings frequently state that the
addressee has moved, they also sometimes inform the sender that the
owner of the subject property has died. This information generally
obligates the notice provider to identify the administrator of the owner's
estate and any possible heirs. 20 3 Some states anticipate this situation by
including a search of probate records in the scope of the original title
search. 20 4 Any state seeking to establish a complete set of well-defined
protocols would do well to specify that the parties should receive notice
of a tax foreclosure in the event of death of the owner or dissolution.
Because the ways in which different types of owners relate to their
properties has little or no bearing on the disposition of their properties
after their demise, one rule should suffice for all owners.
When dealing with returned mailings that indicate that the owner
must be found at another location, differences among various types of
owners play important theoretical and practical roles. The Jones Court
clearly wished to avoid a broad mandate for indefinite searches for
alternate addresses. 205 Yet, an owner who has moved and not updated
his or her address with the registrar of deeds or the local property tax
authority has not given up all rights to direct notification. 20 6 The
proponent of notification follow-up protocols, therefore, must be very
careful in defining the extent and manner of the inquiry for secondary
mailing addresses. Attention to owners' varying relationships to the
subject property address can inform both aspects of the search
parameters.
1. Homeowners
Adequate notice to homeowners should come closest to assuring
actual notice not only because homeowners' redemption rights are so
important, but also because notification of homeowners is comparatively
straightforward. Because they occupy the property being foreclosed,
notice to residential owner-occupants should not involve an open-ended
search for the mailing addresses of persons with the same names as the

203. See Closser v. Hanson Land Co., 177 N.W. 196 (Mich. 1920).
204. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-833 (West 2008).
205. See supratext accompanying notes 125-28.
206. See Akey v. Clinton County, 375 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2004).
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owner. 20 7 Foreclosing petitioners can focus their delivery efforts on one
address-the address of the property subject to foreclosure.
Homeowners, by definition, relate to their property interests through
actual occupancy. Consequently, a cost-benefit standard categorically
confined to homeowners readily generates both initial and follow-up
procedures for each of the three stages of mail notification that will
qualify as "reasonably certain to inform." The identification and location
phases are significant only insofar as they verify the occupancy of the
owner and the consequent applicability of the delivery protocols. If the
land records and the property tax records confirm that the debtor is a
homeowner, then the foreclosing party can focus all efforts on delivering
notice to the subject property address. In the context of an owneroccupied home, Jones's constitutional mandate to follow up on every
known failed delivery attempt provides important protection against
irreparable harm without engendering instability in the notification
protocols. Even if both certified and regular mailings are returned, the
foreclosing party can assure delivery-to the site, if not to the actual
owner-by posting at the occupied premises.
Homeowners are often afforded greater property rule protection than
those that hold more fungible property interests. A system that
guarantees delivery of notice to the subject property does not necessarily
assure actual notice, but it does qualify as "reasonably certain to inform"
homeowners. A less demanding failed delivery follow-up protocol might
also qualify as a constitutional safe harbor but it seems doubtful.2" 8
Klein's standard for a constitutional safe harbor is that there cannot be
any circumstance in which the rule would permit a serious violation of
the constitutional right. In the case of the right to notice and opportunity
to be heard, a follow-up protocol must eliminate those outcomes in
which actual notice is left purely to chance despite the availability of a

207. This does not mean that persons more properly characterized as homeowners rather than
absentee owners cannot receive mail at alternative addresses. See Estate of Lowe ex rel. Harris v. Apex
Tax Invs., Inc., 547 U.S. 1145 (2006) (mem.). Likewise, absentee owners frequently list the property
address as their mailing address and some even falsely claim it as a principal residence. See discussion
infra Part III.B.2. These ambiguities merely accentuate the need to confront the problem of an
alternative address search under the category of absentee owners. See id.
208. A rule that was drawn up to be even more skewed towards overinclusion would more clearly
qualify as a constitutional safe harbor. A statutory requirement that the foreclosing party confirm
delivery to the subject property creates appropriately stronger property rule protection for the
homeowner without opening up the foreclosure to endless delay. But, if a rule is too closely identified
with actual notice, it may cease to be a safe harbor at all. Arkansas provides that a failed attempt at
certified mailing to a homestead owner must be followed up by "actual notice to the owner of a
homestead by personal service of process .... " ARK. CODE ANN, § 26-37-301(e)(1) (2008). Even in the
homeowner context, any requirement of actual notice creates a significant possibility that notification
will never be satisfactorily completed.
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promising and inexpensive means of achieving it. By requiring an
exhaustive approach to subject property delivery of foreclosure notices
addressed to homeowners, the protocol eliminates the need to rely on
publication20 9alone without resorting to a never-ending series of notice
measures.
The real challenge, of course, for a constitutional safe harbor arises
when it validates aborted notification attempts that the standard it
replaces would declare constitutionally inadequate. A look at categories
of property interest holders apart from homeowners presents greater
notification challenges and possibly a diminished commitment to actual
notice. When entertaining the possibility of a follow-up protocol that
could be underinclusive when compared to Mullane's cost-benefit
standard, our dedication to promote the more comprehensible rule over
the less determinate-but more flexible-standard is tested. As Duncan
Kennedy has stated, a clearly defined system of rules cannot last if
judges are "unwilling to bite the bullet, shoot the hostages, break the
eggs to make the omelette and leave the passengers on the platform. 2 10
Constitutional safe harbors do not require that fundamental rights be
sacrificed to the predictability of a rule scheme. 2 11 But the authors of
"reasonably certain" protocols, to provide their adherents assurance of
constitutional compliance, must be afforded sufficient deference. Courts
must allow for some marginal cases in which the generally, but not
exclusively, overinclusive rule validates known failure to notify that the
underlying standard would disallow.
2. Absentee Owners
Just as the problem of the indefinite address search can be eliminated
by single-minded concentration on the address of an owner-occupied
property, it can also be avoided in a very different category of property
owners. Owners of vacant buildings 2 12 that have clearly disassociated

209. Cf Brycie Michelle Loepp, Note, Jones v. Flowers: What is Required When the Noticer
Knows the Noticee Has No Notice?, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 505, 519 (2007) ("notice aimed at the
subject property would appear to be most beneficial to the property owner without putting too much

burden on the State.").
210. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1685, 1701 (1976).
211. See supra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
212. By vacant building, I do not mean a property that is merely unoccupied but one that has such

serious building code violations as to render it uninhabitable and visibly so. See, e.g., BALT, MD INT'L
BUILDING CODE §115.4.1 ("'Vacant structure' means an unoccupied structure that is unsafe or unfit for
human habitation or other authorized use.") Kansas has already adjusted the tax foreclosure pliability
rule mechanism in this context by shortening the period of redemption for such properties. See supra
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themselves from their property should not receive the benefits of an
intensive, and quite probably fruitless, search to locate them. In such a
context, even those follow-up notice requirements that meet the
demanding "reasonably certain" standard can take into account the full
range of costs borne by the foreclosing local government. 213 State tax
foreclosure procedure rule-makers should be supported by reviewing
courts if and when they elect to establish a straightforward system of
sending out a single mailing to the address of record in the title
documents and, if different, the address or addresses known to the
property tax authorities. The costs of an indefinite search for alternate
addresses, or even repeated attempts to make delivery to an address the
addressee no longer visits, go beyond the modest monetary cost of
postage and online records inquiries. Such best efforts requirements
inevitably open the door to second-guessing and title insecurity. Any
constitutionally mandated follow-up requirements should be limited to
those occasioned by the notice provider's recognition of its failure to
comply with its own basic procedures, such as failure to address the
envelope properly or to put sufficient postage on the letter.
Owners with especially strong or weak ties to the subject property
allow rulemakers to create reasonably certain systems that sidestep the
issue of a search for alternative addresses. Owners who merely reside
somewhere other than the subject premises certainly cannot all be
characterized as "free riding" speculators who deserve minimal notice.
Homeowners generally have stronger attachment to their properties than
absentee owners do; owner-occupants have a stronger interest in
preserving the in-kind nature of their property rights because the land
provides them use value apart from a source of income. Absentee
owners that view their land purely as a form of investment should be
indifferent to having that investment converted to another type of asset
that has similar risk and return characteristics. It would be wrong,
however, to presume that all non-resident owners look at properties only
as fungible investments. While some rent their properties to others, these
owners still retain a right of reversion and can decide to personally
occupy the property. Likewise, other owners may move out of their
homes with the express intention of returning.

note 40.
213. Secondary address search requirements that are less restrictive with respect to vacant

property owners than with absentee owners generally are not underinclusive. The rule dispensing with
follow-up address searches in the foreclosure of vacant properties expresses a relevant difference
between these two groups of property owners that flows directly from the general principles articulated
in Mullane. See supra Part I.C. For an instance of true underinclusion by a "reasonably certain"

secondary address search protocol, see infra note 225.
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Nevertheless, achieving actual delivery to an address other than that
of the subject property should not be given the importance expressed by
the Jones requirements. As the dissent in that case observed, the return
of a certified mailing as unclaimed may indicate the addressee's lack of
willingness to go to the post office and pick it up. 2 14 A broad rule that a
foreclosing party must use any and every feasible means to deliver
notice to an absentee owner's address of record would be wasteful and
inefficient. The question of the need to search for alternative addresses,
however, remains open.
Certainly, even in cases of vacant properties, a notice provider
receiving credible information that an owner can be reached at another
address cannot ignore this information. Many states make it clear that
foreclosing parties must use not only the address of record, but also
addresses that they actually know about, including those that they may
become aware of during the notification process.215While such a
requirement may not be constitutionally mandated in all cases, 216 a
system that seeks the benefits of a constitutional safe harbor would do
well not to set up rules that disregard information already known to the
foreclosure petitioner. By doing so, a system that is "reasonably certain
to inform" protects itself from sanctioning grossly inequitable outcomes.
The issue, then, is what constitutes constructive knowledge of
alternative addresses, such that supplemental mailings should be
required. For example, what sources of address information should be
imputed to be "known" to a foreclosing party? Mennonite limited the
world of required addresses to those that could be "ascertained by
reasonably diligent efforts." 217 With vacant property owners, we can
argue that even a system "reasonably certain to inform" can have a very
2 18
narrow standard for constructive knowledge of alternative addresses.
But, for absentee owners generally, even a system of notification that
aspires to eliminate any occasion for violation of due process should

214. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 245 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. POSTAL
SERVICE, DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL § 507, Exh. 1.4.1, available at http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm300/507
.him).
215. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-833 (West 2008).
216. Jones sought to limit the scope of its improvisation requirement by restricting it to those
instances in which the petitioner had actual knowledge that notification efforts had failed. The Court
recognized, but was not persuaded by, the Solicitor General's argument that such an approach might
discourage rule-makers from choosing means, such as certified mail, that provide valuable information
about the success of notification efforts. Jones, 547 U.S. at 237. The constitutional safe harbor approach
advocated in this Article would allow the overall effectiveness of a notification system to be evaluated,
as opposed to setting one aspect of a system against another.
217. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983).
218. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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require those notice providers who know that the addresses they have for
an owner will not provide actual notice to consult readily accessible and
reliable records to find addresses that can be definitively linked to the
notice recipient.
The search for alternative addresses can quickly become a labyrinth
of information that may or may not be relevant to the notification of
actual owners. When a search for a "Gary K. Jones" 2 19 turns up half a
dozen possibilities, including several "G. Jones" addresses, it might be
tempting to say that the "cost" of sending out a few extra notices by mail
is so small as to be discounted in the overall campaign to achieve actual
notice. But, this blithe attitude is wrong for several reasons. First, just as
agents of unsecured creditors should not send "dunning" letters
demanding payment from persons who have no connection to the debt,
neither should foreclosure attorneys "notify" people of a last chance to
"redeem" a property that they do not own. Second, including individuals
with similar names opens up the possibility that receipt of notice will
lead to a false sense of completion of notification. For these (and other)
reasons, constitutionally mandated searches for alternative addresses
should not go beyond sources that can produce addresses220that can be
linked to the actual owner and the subject property address.
In response to Jones, New York has modified its tax foreclosure
protocols to require, as a follow-up on incorrect addresses, that the
foreclosing governmental subdivision request any alternative address
information held by the U.S. Postal Service. 22 1 This method of follow-up
avoids the problem of false positives by focusing on information
connected to the previous mailing address. The question remains,
however, as to whether or not the Postal Service is a sufficient source for
such information.
A follow-up system for locating absentee owners that claims
reasonable certainty would include other governmental records as
secondary sources for addresses. If not already required in the primary
address search, the foreclosing party, upon learning that the primary
219. Gary K. Jones was the appellant in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
220. Cf Elizondo v. Read, 588 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. 1992), abrogatedby Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S.
220 (2006).
It is not, however, reasonable to require the auditor to speculate as to whether these
possible alternatives are addresses for the property owner who owes taxes on the property
in question or another taxpayer with the same name. This type of confusion may not be
very great when the auditor is searching for an Urbano Elizondo in Marshall County. It
does pose a problem, however, when the auditor of Marion County is attempting to find
an address for Mary Smith, or the auditor of Lake County is searching for a John Jones.
Id. at 505.
221. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1125(1)(b) (McKinney 2008).
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address is no longer valid, should be required to consult other local
property-based records such as water billing or code enforcement, these
records are often maintained separately from property tax address
information. But, even though voter registration rolls and motor vehicle
registration records may provide useful information, a reasonably certain
standard should mandate their use only to the extent they can provide a
new address connected to the subject property address. If these public
record entries have no link to the subject property, then any attempt to
obtain valid addresses will probably depend on name matches. If they
archive obsolete address information, on the other hand, a diligent
investigator can be reasonably expected to look for links between former
addresses associated with the interested party and more up-to-date
mailing address information. If, however, these records only contain
current address information, they cannot assure the foreclosing party that
the persons named have any connection to the subject property.
By constructing a thorough notification system that balances the need
for finality against the commitment to actual notice, rulemakers can
bring clarity to foreclosure notice for both notice providers and notice
recipients. When policymakers have, after due consideration for the
rights of all parties involved, struck a balance between actual notice and
practicability of notice completion, courts should respect that
determination and substitute their own judgment only when the system
falls short of the reasonably certain standard. When those enacting rules
for notice by mail neglect to resolve the issue of how a foreclosing party
should respond to bad address information, then courts will have no
choice but to bring the general constitutional standards directly to bear
on the notification decisions of the foreclosing party. For instance, a
court faced with a complaint of lack of actual notice by an owner with a
very unique name might conclude that a constitutionally mandated
secondary address search would have included Internet phone listings or
available voter registration records. However, that same court should
respect the legislature's attempt to systematize such searches if the
legislature decided that such open-ended inquiries should not be part of
a required follow-up protocol.2 22 The true test of the "super standard"
comes when the legislated rule creates a reasonably certain method of
notification that validates a notification choice that a court would find
unconstitutional if it were directly subjected to review under the
desirous-of-actually-informing formulation.
In this crucial question of defining the sources for secondary
addresses, New York has mandated one specific source, the United

222. See supra Part II.F.
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States Postal Service. 223 In requesting forwarding address information,
as opposed to consulting a directory of names, the foreclosing petitioner
would be avoiding the aforementioned trap of false positives. Whether
or not this post office source alone provides a thorough enough coverage
of confirmed secondary address information as to eliminate the need for
other sources is an empirical question. 224 A court evaluating the New
York protocol as a per se diligent search would have to know of the
postal service records' comparative effectiveness relative to other
inexpensive sources of secondary address information. If a court could
conclude that an exclusive focus on the post office as a source of
confirmed alternative addresses did not ignore other methods that must
be tried,225 then the New York protocol would be deemed "reasonably
certain to inform" absentee owners. Consequently, if a particular
absentee owner came forward claiming that his unusual name or the
availability of other identifying information such as his social security
number made him particularly easy to find, the court would respond that
the system created provided such a level of certainty that it should not be
undermined by special cases.
C. Mortgagees: Moving Beyond Notice by Mail
This Article's examination of the loss owners suffer in foreclosure
supports the creation of follow-up procedures for failed notice to most
types of property owners. Although Mennonite extended the basic
entitlement of notice by mail to mortgagees, Jones did not explicitly
require follow-up on unsuccessful notification to mortgagees. While the
right to redeem is extended both to owners and their secured creditors,
the policies that underpin the two classes of redemption rights differ.
223. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. By requiring foreclosing parties to request
available alternative addresses from the Postal Service, New York is not only directing notifiers to a
potentially valuable resource they might have otherwise overlooked, but also instructing potential
foreclosure respondents to keep their address information with the Postal Service up to date. By

specifying a particular approach, rules can enhance efficiency by coordinating activity. See supra notes
152, 154.
224. The effectiveness of class action notification is regularly measured through considerable
statistical research. See Todd B. Hilsee, Shannon R. Wheatman & Gina M. Intrepido, Do You Really
Want Me to Know My Rights?: The Ethics behind Due Process in Class Action Notice is More than Just
Plain Language:A Desire to Actually Inform, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1359, 1370-75 (2005).

225. In the absence of an explicit alternate address protocol, a court might, now or in the near
future, conclude that readily accessible Internet databases such as Accurint.com, see supra note 131, are
generally required alternate addresses resources for a foreclosing party that knows the social security
number of the person to be notified. That same court, however, might defer to a legislative
determination that absentee owners whose social security numbers are known should be treated the same
as those for whom such information is unavailable provided a "reasonably certain" method for obtaining
alternate address information is offered.
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Owners are given the opportunity to protect their in-kind entitlements
because liquidation presents a qualitative loss and the possibility of a
quantitative loss. With the junior lienors, by contrast, the prospect of a
less than vigorous auction process raises the risk of an unnecessary
quantitative loss; but, the liquidation of their security in the subject
property does not represent the same sort of in-kind deprivation. 2 6 The
fact that a foreclosure inflicts monetary damages on a mortgagee or
judgment lien creditor does not make those losses insignificant or even
less important than the injuries suffered by owners. Indeed, in many
cases, a prime mortgagee may be the only party with the inclination or
the ability to redeem a tax delinquent property. If the value of the subject
property has declined since the mortgage was originated, the owner's
equity may have no monetary value.
Regardless, the reality that mortgagees may be more motivated than
owners to redeem properties from an inefficient and unfair liquidation
process does not make actual notice of the proceedings an indispensable
safeguard. If an involuntary sale is conducted irregularly or yields
grossly inadequate consideration, the injured junior lienholder may be
able to avoid the sale as to its interest as a fraudulent conveyance.2 7 In
tax foreclosure, there also may be remedies against the governmental
entity that failed to give adequate protection to the secured creditor's
interests. Lienholders and others with purely financial interests in the
property are more amenable to protection by the liability rule process.
Affording them the same or similar equity of redemption as owners may
protect against faulty liability rule mechanisms, but it is not the only, or
228
even necessarily the most efficient, way.
The nature of the mortgagee's relationship to the subject property
fundamentally differs from that of the owner, even an absentee owner.
Nevertheless, the importance of redemption rights in protecting the
monetary value of the entitlement and preserving its in-kind nature
makes mortgagees no less deserving of reasonable follow-up notification
efforts than owners enjoy. At this point, one might conclude that
mortgagees should be treated the same as absentee owners in follow-up
notification protocols. Legislatures seeking a reasonably certain system
226. It is possible that a quantitatively adequate payout for a liquidated lien could still be less than
totally satisfactory because the cash given would not have the same risk and return characteristics as the
original investment. See Kelly, supra note 201, at 954. This prepayment problem, however, is not truly a

qualitative loss if acceptable investments for the funds exist. Id.
227. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 43, at 667-69; David B. Simpson, Real Property
Foreclosures: The Fallacyof Durrett, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 73, 80 (1984).
228. One could argue that allowing mortgagees to rescue their valuable properties from sale
proceedings that are systematically dysfunctional merely relieves pressure for important reforms and

contributes to inefficiency in liability rule liquidation mechanisms.
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should enact protocols for mortgagees identical to those for absentee
owners. An inquiry into the way mortgagees relate to their property
interests might inspire a supplemental approach to notifying them of a
pending tax foreclosure-an approach that could potentially transform
our conception of notice itself.
Currently, corporate mortgagees named in judicial tax foreclosure
proceedings are generally served in the same manner as defendants in
other cases. For instance, the summons and complaint are delivered to
the nominated resident agent, 229 and the resident agent may be an officer
of the corporation or its attorney. Large corporations commonly enlist
the services of a third party, such as Corporation Trust, to receive
service of process and forward it to their offices. At some point,
someone must open the delivered notice and forward it to the
appropriate department or person within the company. Such routing
usually succeeds, but not always. 230 The paradigm of the property
stakeholder passively waiting for and opening the mail that comes to
him or her becomes more complex and potentially dysfunctional in the
context of a large corporation increasingly dependent on electronic
information.
The three-fold approach to direct notification by identifying, locating,
and making delivery to affected property interest holders is constructed
around in-hand delivery of an appropriately worded letter of warning as
the paradigm for actual notice. The development of a notification by
mail system to make it "reasonably certain to inform" also presumes that
the postal service is the most efficient means of alerting property interest
holders of their last chance to redeem. But, by encouraging rulemakers
to strive for optimal balance of fairness and efficiency in notification
standards, courts may set the stage for a revolution in the way in which
foreclosure notification is conceived.
1. The Possibilities for Notification via the Internet
The financing of land purchases, especially in the residential context,
has been transformed over the last several decades by the emergence of

229. Scott v. Seek Lane Venture, Inc., 605 A.2d 942 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). Notice to the
resident agent has also been required in nonjudicial tax foreclosures. Mont. Earth Res. Ltd. P'ship v. N.
Blaine Estates, Inc., 967 P.2d 376 (Mont. 1998); Reeder Assoc. II v. Chicago Belle, Ltd., 778 N.E.2d
828 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

230. For an example of how internal misdirection of tax lien foreclosure notification can lead to
state supreme court litigation, see Ashness v. Tomasetti, 643 A.2d 802 (R.I. 1994), abrogatedby Kildeer
Realty v. Brewster Realty Corp., 826 A.2d 961 (R.I. 2003).
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the secondary mortgage market. 23 1 For more than a decade, the majority
of money for conventional home mortgages has come from the issuance
of mortgage-backed securities. 232 For the large financial institutions that
acquire loans to package in the capital markets, computers networked to
the information superhighway manage all critical information related to
these assets.
Internet connectivity is just as universal for commercial mortgagees
and institutions that acquire mortgages on the secondary market as
postal delivery. Several different modes of digital transmission present
themselves as candidates for notification of tax foreclosure pendency,
such as electronic mail (e-mail), web publication, and linked databases.
Each mode offers a different lens on the transition to paperless
communication of information. The first two methods model the
notification modes of postal delivery and newspaper publication. Only
the last, however, offers a truly transformative improvement over paperbased notice methods.
E-mail, as the Internet Age analogue to postal delivery, may seem the
obvious choice; it is fast and inexpensive for both the notifier and the
recipient. Like "snail mail," the sender can confirm both delivery and
receipt. 233 The transmission of notice by e-mail also fits with the current
paradigm of the desirous notifier actively seeking out and contacting a
passive, unaware notice recipient. 234 The ways in which people use email, however, differ significantly from how they interact with regular
mail. The sheer volume of e-mails a typical working person receives
reduces the expectation that a person will read all or most e-mails
received. 235 Moreover, e-mail replicates and aggravates some of the
problems involved in postal delivery of notice in the corporate setting.
Like physical mailboxes, virtual mailboxes are generally assigned to
individuals. While title records may identify the entity name of a
foreclosure respondent, a supplemental search may be required to
identify the agent for receiving service of process. There may come a

231. See Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice,
32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269 (1999).
232. Id.
233. Notably, the documentation features of e-mail do not decrease the chances of actual delivery.

However, as noted in Jones, the delivery restrictions placed on certified mail can frequently make it less
likely than regular mail to reach its intended recipient. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 234-35 (2006).

234. For a discussion of e-mail as an alternative form of service for in personam proceedings, see
Jeremy A. Colby, You've Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic Service of
Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337 (2003).
235. Only about one-third of e-mails received in the workplace are even opened. Laura A.
Dabbish et al., UnderstandingEmail Use: PredictingAction on a Message, 2005 PROC. OF THE SIGCHI
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING Sys. 691.
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time when listing for resident agents include electronic as well as postal
delivery information, but even then e-mail would bring only a small
improvement, if any, over snail mail for overcoming the problem of
failed notification.
In some ways, the Internet already serves as a means of notification
for tax foreclosure respondents. Many newspapers that carry legal
notices announcing property litigation also run these same
advertisements on their websites. 236 Potential respondents interested in
making sure that their interests are not referenced in legal notices no
longer need to thumb through the printed pages; instead, if they have
access to the website, they need not even look at all the current notices.
Many of these newspaper websites have internal search engines that
allow users to search for key terms; they need only to be told what to
look for.237 Nevertheless, web publication of legal notices, even if fully
searchable, presumes a great deal of effort from the respondents in
seeking information from the Internet about the viability of their claims
to a property. Even if a vigilant land interest holder could search all the
relevant newspapers using one search engine, these inquiries would have
to be renewed again and again to find important notices in time to act on
them. Ultimately, notice by publication is not likely to be revived in any
form as a viable means of notification for any tax foreclosure
respondent.
Both e-mail and textual web pages as media for communicating news
about the initiation of tax foreclosure fail to take full advantage of the
Internet's capacity for efficient, automated sharing of massive amounts
of information. While foreclosure notification systems can function
quite well by depending on some activity by those who initiate the
litigation, any reliance on actions by the still unaware notice recipient
creates problems. 238 An Internet-based notification system that continues
to treat the computer as a plugged-in mailbox or newspaper that must be
checked by humans raises the same issues of constant vigilance by
property interest holders. The widespread availability of postal delivery
and mailing address information has made notification by mail difficult
to beat from the perspective of the notice recipient. 239 But computers
236. Maryland Daily Record, Public Notices, available at http://www.mddailyrecord.com/pn.cfm
(last visited January 1, 2009); NYLawyer.com, Public Notices, available at http://www.nylawyer.com/di
splay.php/file=/publicnotices/index (last visited November 22, 2008).
237. Id.
238. As shown above, Jones reduced the anticipated cooperation of tax lien foreclosure
respondents to checking their own mailboxes and reading what they find. See discussion supra Part
I.B.I.
239. As shown above, it is the development of universal postal delivery throughout the United
States that has marginalized the caretaker principle once so central to the jurisprudence of notice and
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networked locally and through the Internet offer a new way of managing
information that fundamentally alters the paradigm for balancing the
expectations the law has of plaintiffs and respondents in facilitating
notification.
2. An Interactive Electronic Title Recordation System
Electronic databases have transformed all aspects of business
decision-making. Databases are no longer just silent repositories of
figures. They not only provide the source material for reports, but also
can be programmed to decide when reports are issued and to whom. The
Internet allows data stored in one computer to access and interact with
information thousands of miles away. If applied to the context of tax
foreclosure notification, these features would allow mortgage interest
holders to receive, in real time, information regarding foreclosure
actions on properties concerning them. The mortgagee could plan for its
own way of
distributing that information so as to prepare an appropriate
240
response.
Digital standardization in the secondary mortgage market is already
providing the data infrastructure needed for electronic registration of
mortgage interests. Ten years ago, Fannie Mae and other major players
in the secondary mortgage market founded the Mortgage Electronic
Registry System (MERS) to make it cheaper for real estate loans to be
bundled and resold. 24 1 Acting as the public face for the mortgagee,
242
MERS serves as the nominee for a lender and its loan servicer.
Naming MERS in recording documents eliminates the need for rerecording the loan every time it is transferred.24 3 From a data
management perspective, the heart of the MERS system is its Mortgage
Identification Number (MIN). 244 This 18-digit number allows mortgages

opportunity to be heard. See discussion supra Part II.B.

240. This pre-programmed reaction to the new information might consist of an internal e-mail to
the appropriate person or persons within the company to make a business decision about redemption.
The contents of that e-mail could include not only the essential notice information about the foreclosure,
but also essential data about the loan and the underlying collateral. These generated reports would allow

mortgagees to make quicker, better-informed decisions about redeeming the property and protecting the
collateral.
241. Poonkulali Thangavelu, Commercial Gets a Turn, 11 MORTGAGE TECH. 36 (2004), available
at http://www.mortgage-technology.com/plus/archive/?id= 135281.

242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Carson A. Mullen, Faster Settlements Can Be Yours - With MERS® System, 82 TITLE
NEWS 4 (2003), available at http://www.alta.org/publications/titlenews/03/04_04.cfm (last visited
January 1, 2009).
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to be digitally tracked as they are sold and resold.245 As paperless
mortgages become the industry standard, identifying both mortgage
interests and their holders through digital identifiers will become
increasingly important and commonplace.24 6
With a proper system for unique identifiers for both interest holders
and the interests themselves, electronic notification may move beyond
the uncertainty surrounding mortgagee notice by mail both for the
notifier and the corporate foreclosure respondent. Mennonite's test for
an alternative to service by mail measures the actual likelihood of a
particular means to succeed in bringing notice to the relevant class of
respondents. If proponents of an Internet-based notification system can
produce empirical evidence that it is as effective as mail, then "enotification" may someday serve as the sole means of informing
mortgagees of pending tax sales. Such a computer-based approach to
sharing tax foreclosure information could succeed, however, only if the
notice recipients' computers are directed at the relevant data sets. This
programming would be done by the foreclosure respondents themselves.
If courts recognize how the Internet has transformed information
technology, then the expectation that a corporate mortgagee would link
its database to its electronically recorded interests may be no different
than the belief that it will check its incoming mail in a timely fashion.
Final determinations may hinge on the details of the conditions and
requirements imposed upon a group of notice recipients and on the
precise definition of the group expected to receive information in this
manner.
At relatively little expense, large holders of mortgage interests could
obtain direct access to the electronic repository of records by which the
priorities of their claims are determined. Even if the cost of creating
these data paths does not actually outweigh the losses from internally
misdirected mailed notices, the savings from electronic recordation itself
would be the driving force behind the investment. All tax sales and tax
foreclosures would occasion the digital notices of pendency. When
either a tax sale was scheduled or a foreclosure initiated on a property,
any mortgagee with an interest in the property and a confirmed

245. Id.

246. For nearly a decade, the real estate industry has been working toward the creation of the emortgage, a totally paperless real property loan, as an ideal for maximizing the use of computer
technology to reduce transaction costs. Longing for the Golden Apple, 12 MORTGAGE TECH. 44 (2005),
available at http://www.mortgage-technology.com/plus/archive/?id=135448 (last visited January 1,
2009). The growth of the secondary mortgage market has fostered standardization in an area of law and

business that has been intensely parochial. The Mortgage Industry Standards Maintenance Organization,
since 1999, has been working to define the precise data parameters that would allow mortgages
throughout the nation to be expressed in a common digital language. Id. at 46.
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functioning link 247 to the electronic local land records would be deemed
to have received notice.24 8 What the connected mortgagees do with the
data once they receive it would be up to them. By immediately
integrating the foreclosure notice information with their existing
databases, these lenders will be better able to make quick and efficient
business decisions.
Nothing in Mennonite requires perfect passivity from foreclosure
respondents. 249 The proposed digital notification system would no doubt
impose costs, but would also bring benefits to the recipients. If properly
managed, the data stream provided by the new system would increase
the likelihood of actual notice and improve the flow of this critical
information within the complex corporate systems administering loan
portfolios. If the confirmation mechanism were reliable, the actual
notice rate of efficiency could be nearly perfect. The resulting system of
notification would not only be less costly for the foreclosing party but
more efficient for all involved.
The Supreme Court has consistently stated that it should not be
expected to design optimal notification methods. 250 That project rightly
falls to state legislatures and judicial rulemaking bodies. By granting
these system designers not only the responsibility for but appropriate
latitude in constructing constitutionally compliant notification protocols,
courts will not only stabilize direct notification methods as they contend
with myriad implementation issues, but also encourage the creation of
radically new and more effective ways of securing due process
efficiently.
IV. CONCLUSION

Without institutional encouragement for initiatives such as the one
herein described, foreclosure notice may be unable to move into the
digital age. The Jones majority has framed adequacy of notice in terms
of two questions: First, did the foreclosing petitioner know it had failed

247. Once a state has fully implemented electronic recordation, it should condition a mortgagee's
ongoing access to that system on its consent to maintain a data link to its digitally recorded interests,
including those that the state has converted to digital records from prior paper filings. Technology would
allow the condition to be enforced by periodically sending the mortgagee's computer system "dummy"
data that would require a confirming response.
248. Inversely, any mortgagee not confirmed as receiving data from the system would not be
deemed to have been notified. The consequence for lack of connection would be temporary denial of
access to further electronic recording rather than a futile attempt to claim waiver of due process rights.
249. See supranotes 87-98 and accompanying text.
250. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 240 (2006); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455, n.9
(1982). See supranote 145.
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to give notice? Second, if so, was there something else that could have
been done to achieve actual notice? In the context of mailed delivery to
an owner-occupied property being subjected to a foreclosure, such
questions might make sense. But, if courts show enough deference to
legislative, executive, and judicial entities that craft notification rules,
they can encourage the creation of tax foreclosure protocols that give
steady guidance to foreclosing petitioners contending with a rapidly
evolving world of information technology. If courts considered
notification standards merely as minimum requirements that must be
supplemented by subjecting all notification decisions directly to
constitutional scrutiny, then rulemaking bodies will have little incentive
to seek out best practices.
Given the experience with Pennoyer and the evolution of the mail
system, it is small wonder that rules are associated with obsolescence.
Those who put forth rules struggle to minimize normative inaccuracy by
confining their scopes to appropriately homogenous circumstances.
Even when the development of salient categories facilitates that effort,
change can soon make that work outdated. But, by scaling back the use
of standards to allow for the creation of constitutional safe harbors,
courts can foster innovative approaches that produce net gains for
foreclosure petitioners and respondents alike. Homeowners can be
assured that notice will in fact reach them. At the same time, foreclosure
petitioners will not be forced to attempt personal service on absentee
owners and mortgagees with no assurance that their efforts will result in
clear title. By setting a goal of comprehensive assurance that notification
will be made by the best means available, courts can pave the way for
those institutions best suited to the task to design and implement the
forward-looking approaches to notification that the law of foreclosure
due process so keenly needs in the Internet Age.
In his book The Mystery of Capital,Hernando De Soto illustrates the
critical role that functional titling structures play in the flourishing of
markets and societies. 2 1 He points out that policy makers in the
developed world have taken for granted the efficiency and security
provided by a reliable land records system. 252 As inner-cities throughout
the United States deal with growing abandonment problems, we must
take care that our ignorance of our own past does not become neglect of
our future.
Tax lien foreclosure plays a vital role, along with other title clearing

251. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSIERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 148-49 (2000).

252. Id.
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mechanisms, in resolving the anticommons deadlock that often follows
investment failure in economically struggling areas. If the
impracticability of tax foreclosure fueled by an unrestrained
commitment to actual notice continues to raise the transaction costs of
tax foreclosure, then municipalities may be deprived of one of their most
effective liquidation tools for renewing communities. This article has set
out an understanding of tax foreclosure notification that allows for
innovation and adaptation while maintaining stability in everyday use.
Standards that express fundamental principles of fairness play an
indispensable role in keeping procedural design in step with the times.
But, if tax foreclosure notification procedures are going to have the
clarity and stability necessary to produce marketable titles, then these
standards cannot be applied directly to the many different diligence
questions that foreclosure notification efforts continually generate. By
creating a system of tailored rules that meet particularly high standards
of adequacy, legislatures can satisfy the needs of both notice recipients
and notice providers. Such a thoroughly balanced system can see an
effective land title system through many years of change.

